On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Todd Lee Kramer, 2009 WI 14, affirming 2008 WI App 62
For Kramer: Stephen J. Eisenberg, Marsha M. Lysen

Issue/Holding:

¶37      We conclude that Wagner had an objectively reasonable basis for deciding that a motorist may have been in need of assistance when he stopped behind Kramer’s vehicle. Kramer was parked on the side of a highway after dark with his hazard flashers operating.

State v. Michael L. Popke, 2009 WI 37, reversing unpublished opinion
For Popke: John Miller Carroll, Aaron W. Schenk

Issue / Holding:

¶26      In the case at hand, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Similar to the specific and articulable facts observed by the officer in Post, the officer in this case made the following observations over the course of approximately one block at 1:30 a.m.: The defendant was driving with three-quarters of the vehicle left of the center of the road;

State v. Terion Lamar Robinson, 2009 WI App 97
For Robinson: Beth A. Eisendrath

Issue/Holding: Given the trial court finding that Robinson either lived or stayed at the apartment, the police were authorized to enter to effectuate his arrest under auspices of an arrest warrant:

¶16      In Blanco, the police, who had an arrest warrant for Blanco, entered an apartment where they believed Blanco was staying. 

State v. Michael A. Sveum, 2009 WI App 81, affirmed on other grounds, 2010 WI 92
For Sveum: Robert J. Kaiser, Jr.

Issue/Holding: A search warrant for seizure of the sorts of items Sveum used or kept in connection with a 1996 stalking conviction established probable cause he was keeping such items in 2003:

¶35      The warrant affidavit stated that the affiant was a detective with twenty-two years of experience who had specialized training in stalking crimes. 

State v. Jaime Romero, 2009 WI 32, reversing unpublished opinion
For Romero: Thomas E. Hayes

Issue/Holding: Search warrant affidavit, based in part on incriminatory statements of “unwitting” informant (“Mr. X”), established probable cause:

¶29      In the instant case a confidential informant told a law enforcement officer what someone else had told him.  In such a case, the veracity of each person in the chain is relevant. 

State v. Michael A. Sveum, 2009 WI App 81, affirmed on other grounds, 2010 WI 92
For Sveum: Robert J. Kaiser, Jr.

Issue/Holding: 

¶40      Sveum’s particularity argument is that the many items authorized for seizure were so “non-specific” that the warrant was an invalid general warrant. Police were authorized to seize phone bills, journals, calendars, logs, computers and devices related to computers,

State v. Michael A. Sveum, 2009 WI App 81, affirmed on other grounds, 2010 WI 92
For Sveum: Robert J. Kaiser, Jr.

Issue/Holding: The Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law excludes from coverage “(a)ny communication from a tracking device,” § 968.27(4)(d); a GPS device is such a “tracking device” and, therefore excluded from WESCL coverage.

State v. John David Ohlinger, 2009 WI App 44, PFR filed 4/1/09
For Ohlinger: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶8        The one-party consent exception reads as follows:

(2) It is not unlawful …:….

(b) For a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where the person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception.

State v. John David Ohlinger, 2009 WI App 44, PFR filed 4/1/09
For Ohlinger: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether, for purposes of authorizing one-party consent under WESCL, “a person acting under color of law” may be a law enforcement officer.

Holding:

¶2        [H]e contends that Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2)(b), commonly referred to as the one-party consent exception,

State v. Dwan J. Earl, 2009 WI App 99
For Earl: Mark D. Richards, Christy Marie Hall

Issue/Holding: Earl did not satisfy the “initial minimal burden of establishing some reasonable expectation of privacy” in a package addressed to a fictitious recipient at a vacant residence; moreover, when Earl picked up the package from the driver he gave his own name and thus “disassociated” himself from the addressee.