On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Robert E. Post, 2007 WI 60, reversing unpublished decision
For Post: T. Christopher Kelly

Issue/Holding1: Weaving within lane of travel doesn’t support bright-line rule justifying stop for suspicion of drunk driving:

¶14      The State contends that Sergeant Sherman had reasonable suspicion to stop Post. It advocates the view that repeated weaving of a motor vehicle within a single lane (absent an obvious innocent explanation) provides the reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop.

State v. Robert E. Post, 2007 WI 60, reversing unpublished decision
For Post: T. Christopher Kelly

Issue/Holding: 

¶28 As in Waldner, the police officer in the present case did not observe any actions that constituted traffic violations or which, considered in isolation, provided reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. However, when considered in conjunction with all of the facts and circumstances of the case,

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶23      In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the United States Supreme Court applied the principles of Terry to the validity of protective searches executed during a roadside stop.

State v. David Allen Bruski, 2007 WI 25, affirming 2006 WI App 53
For Bruski: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Bruski did not establish an expectation of privacy in the automobile from which evidence was seized, where his only connection to the automobile was that he had passed out in it; further, he did not know how he’d gotten to his current location and didn’t know where the car key was.

State v. David Allen Bruski, 2007 WI 25, affirming 2006 WI App 53
For Bruski: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶23 Whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area subjected to a search depends on two prongs. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Dixon, 177 Wis.

State v. David Allen Bruski, 2007 WI 25, affirming 2006 WI App 53
For Bruski: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶20 …Bruski, as the proponent of a motion to suppress, has the burden of establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); Rakas v. 

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether Johnson’s statement, “I don’t have a problem with that,” made in response to an officer’s assertion that they were “going to search the vehicle” was voluntary consent or mere acquiescence.

Holding:

¶19      As the record indicates,

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶47      We reject the State’s assertion that Johnson’s collapse to the ground during the frisk because of leg pain (whether feigned or actual) is in any way relevant to the reasonableness of the protective search. As we have explained,

State v. Christopher D. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146
For Sloan: Thomas E. Hayes

Issue/Holding: Immaterial differences of memory don’t establish the “deliberate falsity or reckless disregard” for truth required to trigger a Franks hearing, ¶¶17-21; nor is such a hearing mandated in the absence of specific request, ¶22.

State v. Christopher D. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146

Issue/Holding:

¶26 The trial court here did not find a nexus in the affidavit between the items sought and the house to be searched. Nonetheless, the trial court concluded, in deference to the judge who signed the warrant, that “[t]here’s the good faith exception here. If I were confronted with this affidavit, I think I would have issued the warrant.”

¶27 … “Good faith” is not a doctrine that absolves the neutral and detached judge or magistrate from a careful,