On Point blog, page 2 of 146
SCOW grants review to address whether odor of cannabis alone establishes probable cause
State v. Ayanna Chuntel McAfee, 2024AP1635-CR, petition for review of a summary disposition order of the court of appeals, granted 8/18/26; case activity
SCOW grants Ayanna McAfee’s petition for review to address whether the odor of cannabis alone provides probable cause to search a car.
Defense wins: COA finds defendant exercising his right to avoid contact with law enforcement did not provide reasonable suspicion for investigatory detention.
State v. Derek A. Lamb, 2025AP824, 7/31/26, District IV (not recommended for publication); case activity
The COA reversed the circuit court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of a traffic stop where the only evidence of criminal activity was that the defendant was parked next to another vehicle on a dead-end road at 3 a.m. and the defendant attempted to avoid contact with law enforcement.
Defense Win: COA affirms circuit court order suppressing blood test
State of Wisconsin v. Jorge Luis Perez-Aldape, 2026AP642-CR, 7/29/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
In a unique OWI case, COA relies on SCOW guidance to uphold the circuit court’s order suppressing blood evidence due to a failure to read the person the Informing the Accused Form.
COA holds that consent to blood test was voluntary and rejects challenges to OWI conviction
County of Milwaukee v. Troy Michael Tordoer, 2024AP2492, 7/28/26, District I (ineligible for publication); case activity
Although Tordoer claims that he was coerced into consenting to an evidentiary blood draw, COA agrees with the circuit court that Tordoer’s consent was voluntary.
COA finds reasonable suspicion to extend traffic stop to investigate for OWI and probable cause to arrest.
Village of Grafton v. Blake S. Barnes, 2026AP160, 7/15/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA affirmed the circuit court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of his stop and arrest for speeding and operating while intoxicated where the defendant drove 48 miles per hour on a road posted for 25 miles per hour at 12:30 a.m., the officer smelled alcohol in the vehicle, the defendant exhibited glassy eyes, admitted he drank alcohol that night, and failed field sobriety tests.
COA finds consent to blood test was voluntary under since-repealed provision of Implied Consent Statute
State v. Richard A. Tourtillot, 2024AP1831, 7/7/26, District III (not recommended for publication); case activity
The COA determined the defendant’s consent to a blood draw was voluntary under a since-repealed portion of the Implied Consent Law.
COA affirms suppression order because officer’s mistake of law did not provide reasonable suspicion for traffic stop.
State v. Michael P. Bundy, 2025AP1072, 6/25/26, District IV (not eligible for publication); case activity
The COA affirmed the circuit court’s order suppressing the fruits of a traffic stop because an officer’s mistake of law regarding the driver’s suspected violation of the window tinting regulation did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.
SCOTUS holds that cell phone user has reasonable expectation of privacy in location history data; remands to court of appeals to assess whether a geofence warrant was reasonable.
Chatrie v. United States, USSC No. 25-112, 6/29/2026, reversing a decision of the 4th Circuit, Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
SCOTUS determined that police conduct a search when they gain access to location history data from a third party because a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in records about his or her cell phone’s location. The Court remanded to the federal court of appeals to determine whether the geofence warrant at issue was reasonable.
Defense win: COA affirms order suppressing blood test evidence due to coercion
City of Antigo v. John Paul Fermanich, 2023AP1834, 6/16/26, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
The City of Antigo appeals an order granting John Paul Fermanich’s motion to suppress blood evidence because Fermanich’s consent to the blood draw was coerced. COA affirms in this “close case” as it is the city’s burden to demonstrate that Fermanich freely and voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw.
COA finds officer’s reference to an “automatic” revocation did not render consent to blood draw involuntary
City of Mequon v. Scott Sarver Lindvall, 2025AP1703, 5/13/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
Although Lindvall seizes on the officer’s word choice in discussing the consequences of refusing to consent to an evidentiary blood draw, the Court ultimately finds his arguments unavailing and affirms.