On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Michelle Greenwood, 2019AP248, 6/9/20, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

Greenwood was pulled over for going 81 when the speed limit was 70. The officer testified her eyes were glassy and bloodshot and that her pupils were quite dilated, and did not constrict quickly when he shined his flashlight on them. Per the court of appeals, this was good enough to continue to detain her after the speeding was addressed in order to investigate suspected marijuana intoxication.

State v. Mose B. Coffee, 2020 WI 53, 6/5/20, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2018AP1209; case activity (including briefs)

Under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009), police can search a vehicle after arresting a recent occupant “when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” But how do courts decide when it’s “reasonable to believe” this: is it a typical totality-of-the-circumstances analysis examining all the facts around an arrest? Or, as many courts have concluded, do the elements of the crime suspected–the “offense of arrest”–determine categorically when a search is permitted and when it isn’t? A majority of justices in this case would adopt the former view, but, as we’ve often seen lately, their votes are split between the lead and dissenting opinions. This arguably means there’s no binding holding on the question of law; the only thing we know for sure is that the search in this case is upheld.

State v. Barry J. Krull, 2019AP370-CR, 6/2/20, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity, (including briefs)

Deputies noticed Krull speeding and followed him to his co-worker’s residence. Krull drove 30-40 feet into the driveway when the deputies stopped him, noticed the usual signs of intoxication, conducted FSTs and then took him to the hospital for a blood draw. He moved to suppress arguing that the stop was unlawful and his consent to the blood draw wasn’t voluntary. He lost and appealed.

State v. Donald Simon Mullen and County of Waukesha v. Donald Simon Mullen, 2019AP1187 & 2019AP1188, 5/20/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mullen pulled his car into a bar parking lot around 1:30 a.m. and a passing officer took interest. He pulled into the lot also, and parked behind and to the left of Mullen’s parked vehicle–Mullen had exited and was standing near the closed bar’s front door. The officer pointed at Mullen an “extremely high intensity spotlight” which serves a “disabling function”–preventing the illuminated person from seeing an approaching officer–and approached him on foot, asking where he was coming from. Was Mullen seized by the time he responded in an incriminating way?

State v. Jeffrey I. Quitko, 2019AP200-CR, District 3, 5/12/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Quitko’s motion to suppress evidence obtained following his traffic stop for speeding violation should have been granted because law enforcement lacked probable cause to request that he submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT).

State v. David William Krumm, 2019AP243-CR, District 3, 5/5/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under § 343.303 and County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999), there was probable cause to believe Krumm was operating while intoxicated, so police could request he submit to a preliminary breath test.

United States v. Dustin Caya, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 19-2469, 4/16/20

Caya was on extended supervision. Police developed reasonable suspicion to search his home, and duly did so under § 302.113(7r), which was created by 2013 Wisconsin Act 79. Caya argues that statute violates the Fourth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit rejects the claim.

State v. Katelyn Marie Leach, 2019AP1830-CR, 4/16/20, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication; case activity (including briefs)

Leach pled “no contest” to 2nd offense operating a motor vehicle with a restricted substance. She  moved to suppress evidence that she gave an officer after he told her that (a) if she only had paraphernalia or a small amount of marijuana she would just receive a municipal citation, and (b) he was going to search her regardless.

State v. Keith M. Abbott, 2020 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)

After losing a suppression motion, Abbott pled “no contest” to 2nd degree intentional homicide. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of suppression for some evidence and reversed it as to other evidence. It held that Abbott’s mental breakdown during questioning did not relieve him of his duty make an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. And while it rejected the State’s request that it adopt a new harmless error test for cases where the defendant appeals the denial of suppression after pleading guilty, it nevertheless affirmed under the existing harmless error rule.

State v. Shannon G. Potocnik, 2019AP523, 4/14/20, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

There’s a deep split nationwide about whether the community caretaker doctrine can ever permit entry into a home. Wisconsin has held that it can, and this pro se appeal is of course necessarily fact-bound. But the decision is thorough and provides a good summary of state community-caretaker law as it stands, along with a much briefer discussion of blood draws based on exigency.