On Point blog, page 30 of 141
Bomb scare adjudication upheld, but restitution order reversed in part
State v. J.P., 2017AP1905, District 1, 9/5/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
J.P. was adjudicated delinquent for calling in two bomb scares to his high school. The court of appeals rejects his claims that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and unlawfully searched his phone and that his confession was involuntary. However, the court agrees with J.P. that part of the restitution order is invalid.
Court upholds convictions for multiple counts of sending unlawful emails, bail jumping
State v. Brian A. Barwick, 2017AP958-CR through 2017AP961-CR, District 1, 9/5/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Barwick was charged with eleven counts of various crimes in four separate cases that were consolidated for trial. He makes various unsuccessful challenges to his convictions.
Court of appeals sees no ineffective assistance in not challenging phone-tracking warrant
State v. Brinkley L. Bridges, 2017AP2311-CR, 9/25/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Bridges pled to five felonies involving guns and drugs; the evidence against him was derived, in part, from a warrant police had obtained allowing them to track his cell phone. He argues counsel was ineffective for not challenging that warrant because the application didn’t show probable cause.
Defendant consented to search and had no expectation of privacy in files put on P2P file sharing network
State v. Ronald Lee Baric, 2018 WI App 63; case activity (including briefs)
Police failed to read Baric his Miranda rights, but the court of appeals still found that he consented to a search of his computer. It also resolved a 4th Amendment issue of first impression for Wisconsin: a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in files he offers for download on a P2P file sharing network.
Information from named citizen informant provided reasonable suspicion for traffic stop
City of West Bend v. Erik J. Wille, 2018AP151, District 2, 8/15/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Wille was waylaid by police while he was waiting for his Wendy’s order, leading to his arrest for OWI. The restaurant manager had called police after seeing open beer cans in Wille’s car when he was in the drive-thru. He claims the information from the manager didn’t give police reasonable suspicion to stop him. That claim fails.
ACLU news: Wisconsin sheriff policies on immigration don’t satisfy constitution; racial profiling lawsuit settled
The ACLU just released a report called “Fixing Wisconsin Sheriff Policies on Immigration Enforcement.” Among other things, it found that 24 Wisconsin counties have policies that allow or encourage the detention of immigrants for being undocumented or entering the country legally and then overstaying a visa. Without a warrant, this violates the constitution. Another 29 counties have no policies at all. What’s your county’s policy? Click here for the press release and here for the report.
Deputy had reasonable suspicion to extend stop based on driver’s odor of alcohol and glassy eyes
State v. Misty Dawn Donough, 2017AP2000-CR, 7/10/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication), case activity (including briefs)
Deputy Moldenhauer saw Donough’s car disabled on an interstate and stopped to help. Moldenhauer repeatedly interacted with Donough, told her to get into the car, put it in neutral, and steer as the car was pushed on to a side street. Then she approached Donough for her license and insurance and saw her glassy eyes and detected the odor of alcohol.
SCOW: Courts can’t suppress evidence solely to preserve judicial integrity
State v. Christopher John Kerr, 2018 WI 87, 7/6/18, reversing a circuit court order on bypass of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
Wisconsin has recognized 2 grounds for applying the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence–to deter police misconduct and to ensure judicial integrity. State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, ¶¶20, 33, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568; State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶¶3, 31 n.10, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. The majority opinion in this case clarifies that a judge’s failure to follow the law when issuing a warrant cannot serve as an independent basis for the exclusionary rule.
Blood draw from unconscious motorist again fractures SCOW
State v. Gerald P. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, 7/3/18, on certification from the court of appeals; 2015AP304-CR, SCOTUS cert. granted, 1/11/19, vacated and remanded, 6/29/19; case activity (including briefs)
This is the supreme court’s third attempt to decide whether provisions of Wisconsin’s implied consent law comport with the Fourth Amendment. If you’ve been following along, you might have predicted the result: no majority opinion, no binding holding, and, as the lead opinion laments, a state of confusion going forward. Briefly: the lead, 3-justice opinion says “we overrule State v. Padley,” a court of appeals decision addressing a related (though not identical) issue, but it in fact does no such thing: it seems, in fact, to echo much of the discussion in Padley, and anyway, it’s a three-justice minority, and can’t overrule anything. A two-justice concurrence says the legislature can’t legislate away a motorist’s right to refuse consent to a search, but would hold that a blood draw of an unconscious OWI suspect doesn’t require a warrant anyway, despite a pretty clear statement to the contrary from SCOTUS. And a two-justice dissent also says the implied consent law doesn’t equal constitutional consent. So, just as in State v. Hager from this term, you have a result that favors the state, even though a majority of justices disagree with the state’s constitutional argument.
SCOW: Warrantless blood draw was okay; using refusal as aggravating sentencing factor was not
State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 7/3/18, reversing in part and remanding an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
The supreme court holds there were exigent circumstances that allowed police to draw blood from Dalton without a warrant after he refused to consent to a blood draw. But a majority of the court also holds that the sentencing judge erred by explicitly imposing a harsher sentence on Dalton because he refused to consent to the blood draw.