On Point blog, page 39 of 143
Marijuana odor, fleeing teens gave exigent circumstances to search apartment
State v. Robert Torres, 2017 WI App 60; case activity (including briefs)
It’s unclear why this opinion is recommended for publication–it seems to be a pretty straightforward application of the law to a particular fact situation.
The statutes authorize fines for 7th and greater OWI offenses
State v. Michel L. Wortman, 2017 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)
A glitch in the OWI penalty statute appears to suggest that OWI 7th and greater offenses don’t allow for a fine, but only for the imposition of the forfeiture provided for first-offense OWI. The court of appeals concludes otherwise. The court also rejects Wortman’s claim that he was under arrest when a sheriff’s deputy transported him back to the scene of the accident he was in.
Court of appeals affirms “Badger stop;” defendant was free to leave despite questions and armed back-up officer
State v. Michael A. Johnson, 2017AP331-CR, District 2, 8/23/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Officer Baldwin stopped Johnson for failing to dim his headlights, then cited him for that and failing to provide proof of insurance for the car he was driving (his mom’s). Baldwin told Johnson that he was free to go, so Johnson started to walk away. Baldwin asked “do you have drugs, weapons or alcohol in the car?” Johnson replied “no.” Baldwin asked if he could search the car. Johnson replied that the car did not belong to him.
“Dazed and confused” and smelling of alcohol = reasonable suspicion of OWI
State v. Denton Ricardo Ewers, 2016AP1671-CR, 8/22/2017, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An employee at Family Dollar called the police to report that man who appeared “dazed and confused” and whose breath smelled of intoxicants had come into the store before leaving in a gold Ford Focus and heading west. An officer looked for the Focus but could not find it. Two hours later, the employee called back to say the same man, still “dazed and confused,” had once again been in the store, and once again had departed to the west in his gold Ford Focus. This time, the officer located the car and stopped it. The driver, Ewers, seemed intoxicated, which he eventually proved to be.
When a change in expression amounts to reasonable suspicion for a frisk
State v. Kavin K. Nesbit, 2017 WI App 58; case activity (including briefs)
Nesbit ran out of gas on I 94. He and his buddy were walking on the shoulder, red can in hand, to get gas when Deputy Fowles pulled up and told them he’d give them a ride to and from the gas station. But first, he asked them if they had any weapons. The friend said “no.” Nesbit who had been behaving normally “‘all of a sudden’ became ‘very deflated’ and shook his head slightly in the negative.”
Courts may reopen suppression hearings to give State 2nd kick at meeting burden of proof
State v. Jesse U. Felbab, 2017AP12-CR, 8/2/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
If at first you don’t succeed, try, try, try again. That’s surely the State’s take away from this decision. Deputy Schoonover stopped Felbab for erratic driving and determined that field sobriety tests and a drug-detecting dog were in order, so he called for a back up. This led to the State charging Felbab with possession of THC. He moved to suppress. Before giving its decision, the court told the parties that it would be willing to grant a motion to reopen if the losing party wanted to enter more evidence into the record. Hint. Hint.
Tumblr qualifies as an “identified citizen informant,” and sec. 939.617(2) is not void for vagueness
State v. Samuel Silverstein, 2017 WI App 64; case activity (including briefs)
Pursuant to a warrant, police searched Silverstein’s computer for child porn. The “informer” was Tumblr, which is required by federal law to report suspected child pornography to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Silverstein challenged the warrant as well as the mandatory minimum sentence the trial court imposed per §939.617, which he contends is unconstitutionally vague.
Note to police (again): Holding pants up by waistband is not reasonable suspicion for stop!
State v. Travail L. Lewis, 2017AP234-CR, 7/25/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After shots were fired in a high crime area of Milwaukee, police dispatched Officer Robert Crawley (no relation to the 7th Earl of Grantham) to investigate. He and his partner saw Lewis (African American) walking down an alley holding the waistband of his pants. They told him to stop and hold up his hands. Then they drew their guns. Lewis told them that he had a gun but no permit, so they arrested him. The State charged him with misdemeanor carrying a concealed weapon. Lewis filed an unsuccessful suppression motion. On appeal, the State wisely conceded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Lewis based on State v. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44, 353 Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483.
Court of appeals upholds “identification search” after arrest
State v. Janaya L. Moss, 2016AP1856-CR, 7/25/17 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Moss and another woman had a fight in a bar; responding police found Moss intoxicated to the point of incoherence. They arrested the other woman and frisked her, but could not find any identification (she would give only a first name). One officer noticed a wallet on a nearby table and asked the other woman if it was hers; she did not respond. The officer opened the wallet, revealing Moss’s ID but also cocaine and marijuana.
COA: Warrantless blood draw constitutional; OK to punish defendant for not consenting
State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP2483-CR, 7/19/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 11/13/17, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 2018 WI 85; case activity (including briefs)
Patrick Dalton was badly injured in a car crash. He argues on appeal that there was no exigency justifying the warrantless blood draw that revealed his intoxication; he also argues the circuit court erred when it considered his refusal to consent to the blood draw as an aggravating factor for sentencing.