On Point blog, page 41 of 141
Court of appeals finds officer had consent to enter home based on de novo review of conduct on body cam video
State v. Faith N. Reed, 2016AP1609-CR, 3/23/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/18, reversed, 2018 WI 109; case activity (including briefs)
Officer Keller followed Sullivan into Reed’s apartment and saw controlled substances there. Reed sought suppression on the grounds that the officer did not have consent to enter her home. Based on a de novo, frame-by-frame review of a body cam video, the court of appeals held that Sullivan by his conduct (not his words) unequivocally invited Keller into Reed’s apartment.
Factual findings defeat motorist’s claim he did not consent to BAC test
State v. Joseph K. Larson, 2016AP1002-CR, 3/21/17, District III, (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Joseph Larson contends on appeal that the circuit court erred when it concluded he consented to a breath alcohol test after his arrest for OWI.
How to frame your 4th Amendment issue for SCOTUS
Assuming that Neil Gorsuch is confirmed, you’ll want to know how he thinks about the 4th Amendment. He could prove to be your swing vote. SCOTUSbl0g offers an in-depth analysis of Gorsuch’s 4th Amendment jurisprudence here.
While you’re at it, you might take a look at Gorsuch’s views on the First Amendment here.
Crossing fog line and pulling into closed business at 1:30 a.m. is reasonable suspicion of OWI
County of Marathon v. Armin James Balzar, 2016AP1471, 3/14/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Balzar argues on appeal that the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion because it was based on the “act of simply turning into a closed business parking lot, without more.” (¶8). The court disagrees.
Court of Appeals: traffic on East Courtland must yield to traffic on North Hopkins
State v. Randolph Arthur Mantie, 2015AP2443-CR, 3/7/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
As the court notes, the relevant events in this case took place at a “hard-to-describe intersection” so here’s a visual aid.
Splintered SCOW fails to decide constitutionality of statute authorizing blood draws from unconscious persons
State v. David W. Howes, 2017 WI 18, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
The supreme court granted certification in this case to decide an important question: Does Wisconsin’s implied consent statute create a categorical “consent” exception to the warrant requirement as to unconscious drivers, thus allowing police to collect blood without having to get a warrant or establish exigent circumstances or some other exception? But the court doesn’t answer that question, leaving the law in a muddle. On top of that, the court reverses the circuit court’s suppression order, though without a majority agreement as to why the blood draw was legal, and with some justices invoking a theory the state didn’t argue in the circuit court.
Cop had reasonable suspicion to perform FSTs based on time of stop and smell of alcohol
City of Waukesha v. Derek R. Pike, 2016AP1720, 3/1/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer stopped Pike at 1:00 a.m. because his car lacked a front license plate. The officer smelled alcohol, and Pike admitted that he was coming from a nightclub where he had consumed 1 or 2 beers. The officer conducted FSTs, and the results caused him to request blood chemical tests, which Pike refused.
Lack of recent calibration of radar unit didn’t render stop for speeding unreasonable
State v. Thomas M. Gibson, 2016AP1933-CR, 2/22/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer trained in visually estimating speed observed a car driven by Gibson going what he estimated to be 25 m.p.h. in a 15 m.p.h. speed zone. He trained a radar unit on the car, and that said the car was going 26 m.p.h. The officer stopped the car, and Gibson was ultimately arrested for OWI. It turns out the radar unit hadn’t been calibrated since the early years of the internet—1994. (¶¶3-5). No matter, says the court of appeals. The officer still had reasonable suspicion for the stop.
Officer had reasonable basis to believe defendant committed traffic violations
Oneida County v. Joseph A. Ravens, 2015AP2612, 2/22/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Raven was driving a pickup and towing a trailer when he entered an intersection as the light was changing. Unfortunately for him, Officer Young was watching and claimed the light turned red before Raven entered the intersection. He stopped Raven, smelled intoxicants, and observed slurred speech. After being charged with OWI, Raven moved for suppression and testified that the traffic light was yellow and turned red only after he was actually in the intersection. You can guess whom the trial court believed.
Moving driver 8 miles to conduct field sobriety tests didn’t transform stop into arrest
State v. Dane C. McKeel, 2016AP884-CR, District 4, 2/16/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
“Due to the extremely cold, windy, icy, and snowy conditions” police moved McKeel approximately 8 miles from where he was stopped to a local police department so that McKeel had the “best opportunity” to complete field sobriety tests. (¶¶4-5). Moving McKeel this far did not transform the stop into an arrest.