On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Glenn T. Zamzow, 2017 WI 29, 4/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant whose guilt or innocence is at stake at trial may employ the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ …. But the Sixth Amendment does not mandate that statements considered at a suppression hearing face the crucible of cross-examination. Nor does the Due Process Clause demand this. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not deny Zamzow his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by relying on an audio recording of a deceased officer’s statement at the suppression hearing.” (¶31).

County of Dodge v. Alexis N. Unser, 2016AP2172, 4/6/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Unser wasn’t unlawfully moved outside the “vicinity” of the traffic stop when the officer transported her six miles to conduct field sobriety tests.

State v. Terrence L. Perkins, 2016AP1427-CR,4/4/17, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At Perkins’ suppression hearing, Officer Stetzer testified that he saw Perkins drive through a stop sign and part way through a cross walk into the middle of an intersection where he then backed up to allow a car to pass before proceeding. The squad car video did not capture Perkins’ stop sign violation; it only recorded him backing up. Perkins argued that the position of the squad car would have prevented the officer from seeing whether he complied with the stop sign before proceeding into the intersection. He thus argued that Stetzer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him.

State v. Faith N. Reed, 2016AP1609-CR, 3/23/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/18, reversed, 2018 WI 109; case activity (including briefs)

Officer Keller followed Sullivan into Reed’s apartment and saw controlled substances there. Reed sought suppression on the grounds that the officer did not have consent to enter her home. Based on a de novo, frame-by-frame review of a body cam video, the court of appeals held that Sullivan by his conduct (not his words) unequivocally invited Keller into Reed’s apartment.

State v. Joseph K. Larson, 2016AP1002-CR, 3/21/17, District III, (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Joseph Larson contends on appeal that the circuit court erred when it concluded he consented to a breath alcohol test after his arrest for OWI.

Assuming that Neil Gorsuch is confirmed, you’ll want to know how he thinks about the 4th Amendment. He could prove to be your swing vote. SCOTUSbl0g offers an in-depth analysis of Gorsuch’s 4th Amendment jurisprudence here.

While you’re at it, you might take a look at Gorsuch’s views on the First Amendment here.

County of Marathon v. Armin James Balzar, 2016AP1471, 3/14/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Balzar argues on appeal that the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion because it was based on the “act of simply turning into a closed business parking lot, without more.” (¶8). The court disagrees.

State v. Randolph Arthur Mantie, 2015AP2443-CR, 3/7/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

As the court notes, the relevant events in this case took place at a “hard-to-describe intersection” so here’s a visual aid.

State v. David W. Howes, 2017 WI 18, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court granted certification in this case to decide an important question: Does Wisconsin’s implied consent statute create a categorical “consent” exception to the warrant requirement as to unconscious drivers, thus allowing police to collect blood without having to get a warrant or establish exigent circumstances or some other exception? But the court doesn’t answer that question, leaving the law in a muddle. On top of that, the court reverses the circuit court’s suppression order, though without a majority agreement as to why the blood draw was legal, and with some justices invoking a theory the state didn’t argue in the circuit court.

City of Waukesha v. Derek R. Pike, 2016AP1720, 3/1/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police officer stopped Pike at 1:00 a.m. because his car lacked a front license plate. The officer smelled alcohol, and Pike admitted that he was coming from a nightclub where he had consumed 1 or 2 beers. The officer conducted FSTs, and the results caused him to request blood chemical tests, which Pike refused.