On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Sabrina Marie Hebert, 2015AP2183-CR, District 3, 10/12/2016 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects Hebert’s challenges to the circuit court’s factual findings and its conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the car she was driving.

State v. Darren Wade Caster, 2015AP1965-CR, District 3, 10/12/2016 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The fact that an officer stopped Caster outside the limits of his jurisdiction does not mean the evidence garnered from the stop must be suppressed because the stop was reasonable.

State v. Samuel K. Dixon, 2015AP2307-CR. 10/6/16; District 1 (per curiam; uncitable); case activity (including briefs)

You may not cite this per curiam opinion as precedent in any Wisconsin court, but happily you can bask in Dixon’s victory. The court of appeals wisely held that his 5-minute, friendly conversation with a “thicker black female” at 6:00 a.m. on 29th and Lisbon in Milwaukee did not constitute reasonable suspicion of prostitution-related activity.

State v. Jordan Branovan, 2016AP622-CR, 10/5/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Here’s a sure fire way for law enforcement to comply with Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015): summon a K-9 officer before initiating a traffic stop in order to minimize the extension of it. That’s what Officer Heinen did here once he saw that Branovan was not wearing a seat belt but was wearing a hat with what looked like a multicolored pot leaf on it. Four and half minutes later, the K-9 officer arrived on the scene, conducted a sniff, which led to the discovery of THC and drug paraphernalia.

State v. Kenneth M. Asboth, Jr., 2015AP2052-CR, 9/29/16, District 4 (not recommended for publication); petition for review granted 1/9/17; affirmed 2017 WI 76; case activity (including briefs)

Police suspected Kenneth Asboth in a bank robbery. They received a tip that he would be at a storage facility, and converged there, where they arrested him. They also decided to seize the car he had been driving, which was parked in the lane between storage sheds. Once the car was at the police station, officers searched it, finding evidence linking Asboth to the robbery. The trial court denied suppression, holding that the car was validly impounded, and that an inventory search was thus permitted. 

State v. Courtney L. Carney, 2016AP175-CR & 176, 9/21/2016, District 2 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At 3 a.m. on a Saturday morning, police pulled a car over for a broken light. The car driving in front of the targeted vehicle also stopped; this was Carney’s. The police ended up detaining him too, leading to his eventual OWI arrest; the question here is whether they had reasonable suspicion for the initial detention.

Town of Grand Chute v. Shelley L. Kowalewski, 2015AP1788, District 3, 9/20/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The stop of Kowalewski’s car was supported by probable cause that she violated § 346.34(1)(b), which requires a drive to use a turn signal “[i]n the event any other traffic may be affected by the movement” of the vehicle.

State v. Mary G. Zinda, 2016AP455-CR, District 2, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Two police officers approached Zinda as she got out of her car on her own driveway, but this did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. And even if it was a seizure, it was supported by reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Zinda was operating while intoxicated.

State v. John J. Valenti, 2016AP662, District 2, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After stopping and ticketing Valenti for speeding, a state trooper continued to detain him to investigate whether he was operating while intoxicated. The court of appeals rejects Valenti’s claim that the trooper lacked specific, articulable facts justifying expanding the investigatory purpose of the stop because the only fact on which the trooper acted was a general odor of intoxicants, which could have emanated from the passenger. (¶¶2-4, 6, 9).

State v. Troy Paulson, 2015AP456-CR, 8/31/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion, not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is the second dog sniff case from District 2 in less than a week. See our post on State v. Downer Jossi here, which recognized that SCOTUS’s Rodriguez v. United States overruled SCOW’s State v.