On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Mary G. Zinda, 2016AP455-CR, District 2, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Two police officers approached Zinda as she got out of her car on her own driveway, but this did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. And even if it was a seizure, it was supported by reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Zinda was operating while intoxicated.

State v. John J. Valenti, 2016AP662, District 2, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After stopping and ticketing Valenti for speeding, a state trooper continued to detain him to investigate whether he was operating while intoxicated. The court of appeals rejects Valenti’s claim that the trooper lacked specific, articulable facts justifying expanding the investigatory purpose of the stop because the only fact on which the trooper acted was a general odor of intoxicants, which could have emanated from the passenger. (¶¶2-4, 6, 9).

State v. Troy Paulson, 2015AP456-CR, 8/31/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion, not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is the second dog sniff case from District 2 in less than a week. See our post on State v. Downer Jossi here, which recognized that SCOTUS’s Rodriguez v. United States overruled SCOW’s State v.

State v. Paul R. Vanderlinden, 2015AP901-CR, District 3, 8/30/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanderlinden was convicted of OWI 2nd and driving with a PAC 2nd. An officer had stopped Vanderlinden’s car because two witnesses had reported him drinking beer and leaving the theater with a beer in his pocket. According to the court of appeals, this did not amount to reasonable suspicion of OWI.

Darryl J. Sutton v. Randy Pfister, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2888, 2016 WL 4446561, 8/24/16

Sutton filed a habeas petition challenging his sexual assault conviction on the ground the evidence connecting him with the crime was obtained by the state through a conceded violation of the Fourth Amendment in a different case. The district court ruled in his favor, but the court of appeals holds there’s no Fourth Amendment violation because the evidence would inevitably have been discovered.

State v. Katherine J. Downer Jossi, 2016AP618-CR, 8/24/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This court of appeals decision acknowledges what On Point predicted here when SCOTUS issued Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). That is, Rodriguez, which held that prolonging a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity  beyond the traffic infraction, effectively overruled State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶32, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748, which allowed for a reasonable delay based on the totality of the circumstances (a.k.a. the “incremental intrusion” test).

United States v. Frank Caira, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1003, 2016 WL 4376472, 8/17/16

During a drug investigation the government issued subpoenas to two internet service providers—Microsoft, the owner of Hotmail, and Comcast the owner of an Internet Protocol address associated with the Hotmail address being investigated. The subpoenas provided information that led investigators to Caira. (Slip op. at 2-4). His claim that the subpoenas amounted to unreasonable warrantless searches is rejected because voluntarily sharing the information with the internet providers meant Caira had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.

State v. Sandra D. Noren, 2015AP1969-CR, District 2, 8/17/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police officer responding to a 911 call conducted a warrantless search of Noren’s bedroom and found drugs and paraphernalia. The court of appeals holds the search was justified under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. 

County of Milwaukee v. Alpesh Shah, 2015AP1581, District 1, 8/16/16 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Shaw was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a restricted controlled substance in his blood pre-McNeely. He challenged the warrantless draw of his blood because there were no exigent circumstances–THC doesn’t dissipate like alcohol, and the deputy had plenty of time to get a warrant. Moreover, the State did not charge him with operating while under the influence, so dissipation wasn’t even relevant. The State only need to show that THC was present in his blood, not that a particular amount of THC was in his blood.

In May, On Point reported on U.S. v. Randy Johnson, a split decision by the 7th Circuit in which the dissent accused the majority of authorizing Milwaukee police to seize someone for “parking while black.” See our post here. Guess what? The 7th Circuit just granted rehearing en banc, so stay tuned for further developments this case.