On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Bradley L. Kilgore, 2016 WI App 47; case activity (including briefs)

The execution of the search warrant at Kilgore’s home started with a heavily armed officers, including a SWAT team, entering and putting Kilgore down on the floor at gunpoint; but once the home was “cleared” and weapons were secured and the SWAT team left, Kilgore was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Thus, the statements he made to police while they searched his home were admissible despite the lack of a Miranda warning.

State v. Arturo Luiz-Lorenzo, 2015AP1540-CR, 5/18/2016, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police discovered cocaine on Luiz-Lorenzo as a result of his arrest; he challenges the grounds for the initial Terry stop.

United States v. Randy Johnson, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1366, 5/17/16

Taking Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), to its logical extreme, the Seventh Circuit holds that detaining the passengers in a car parked too close to a crosswalk was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Eugene A. Sweeney, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3785, 5/9/16

The police officers’ search of the basement of the apartment building where an armed robbery suspect lived was neither a trespass nor an invasion of the apartment dwellers’ curtilage. Thus, the gun found during the search was lawfully seized and not subject to suppression.

State v. Justin Carl Herman Hembel, 2015AP1220-CR, 5/10/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police lacked probable cause to believe Hembel violated § 346.54, governing “How to park and stop on streets,” so the stop of Hembel was unlawful.

State v. Zachary W. Swan, 2015AP1718-CR, 5/5/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity, including briefs

Swan was convicted of OWI 2nd with a prohibited alcohol content. On appeal he argued that the circuit court should have suppressed the results of a preliminary breath test and other evidence due to the absence of probable cause. The court of appeals initially rejected Swan’s argument on the ground of issue preclusion, but on reconsideration agreed with Swan that issue preclusion “could not apply as a matter of law.” (¶2, ¶13). It now rejects Swan’s argument on the merits and affirms.

State v. Melvin P. Vongvay, 2015AP1827-CR, District 2, 5/4/2016 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wisconsin Stat. § 885.235(1g) makes a blood alcohol test automatically admissible in a drunk driving prosecution if the blood is drawn within three hours of the alleged driving. The court here holds that an officer who was running up against the end of that three-hour window was justified in drawing blood without seeking a warrant.

State v. Gary F. Lemberger, 2015AP1452-CR, 4/14/2016, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 10/11/2016, affirmed, 2017 WI 39; case activity (including briefs)

A breathalyzer test is a Fourth Amendment search, and state case law holds that the state may not invite a jury to view a defendant’s refusal to consent to a search as evidence of guilt. So, can a prosecutor argue that a defendant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer shows his guilt? Don’t look to this case for an answer.

United States v. Lonnie Whitaker, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 14-3290 & 14-3506, 4/12/16

Taking a drug-sniffing dog into the locked, second-floor hallway of an apartment building where there were at least six to eight apartments without first obtaining a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment under Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

State v. Michael A. Durham, 2015AP1978-CR, 4/12/2016, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police were dispatched in response to a 6:30 p.m. phone call from a neighbor about unintelligible yelling and “banging” that shook the walls of Durham’s residence. (¶2). After knocking and ringing the doorbell and receiving no response, police simply entered the house, guns drawn, and proceeded toward the stairs, where they encountered Durham. (¶¶3-5). The officers ordered Durham to show his hands, he didn’t, and they tasered him. (¶6). He was charged with resisting an officer, unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained via the warrantless search of his home, and was convicted at trial. (¶1). The court of appeals here reverses the conviction because the suppression motion should have been granted.