On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

Columbia County v. Jessica N. Johnson, 2015AP332, District 4, 8/27/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to extend Johnson’s detention and ask her to do field sobriety tests based on additional information he gleaned after the initial contact with Johnson. State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 93-95, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999), applied.

Village of Fredonia v. Bruce A. Gossett, 2015AP298, District 2, 8/12/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police need probable cause to believe the driver is operating while intoxicated before they can request a PBT from the driver of a noncommercial vehicle; but for a commercial driver, they can request a PBT if they detect “any presence” of alcohol or have “reason to believe” the driver is operating with an alcohol concentration above zero, § 343.303, and State v. Goss, 2011 WI 104, ¶12, 338 Wis. 2d 72, 806 N.W.2d 918. The “reason to believe” standard was satisfied in this case, so police properly asked Gossett—the driver of a semi tractor-trailer—for a PBT.

Winnebago County v. Kelli M. Kosmosky, 2015AP585, District 2, 8/5/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A reasonable officer would be led to believe there was more than a possibility Kosmosky had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated under the facts presented, even though he didn’t know exactly when she operated her vehicle.

State v. James Michael Warren, 2014AP792-CR, District 3, 8/4/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), which was the law at the time of Warren’s arrest, a person must present their reasonable objection and the basis for the objection at the time of the blood draw, and failure to do so means the person can’t raise it later in the case.

State v. Kim M. Lerdahl, 2014AP2119-CR, District 3, 8/4/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In an interesting decision that sheds some light on how to apply the newly-adopted “reasonable mistake of law” doctrine to traffic stops, State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,  the court of appeals holds that it a police officer’s mistaken belief that the truck she stopped was required to have a center high-mount stop (or brake) lamp (CHMSL) was not a reasonable mistake of law and, therefore, the stop was unlawful.

State v. Tammy R. Fullmer, 2015AP640-CR, District 4, 7/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Trial counsel was deficient for failing to effectively impeach the officer’s testimony that Fullmer failed to stop in front of a stop line because the intersection in question didn’t have a stop line; however, there were multiple other observations the officer made that justified the traffic stop even in the absence of the stop line violation (e.g., extremely slow driving, driving down the middle of a two lane road, weaving in her lane), so Fullmer wasn’t prejudiced. (¶¶4-7, 11, 14).

Oconto County v. Joseph R. Arndt, 2014AP2955, District 3, 7/21/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Arndt was not arrested within the curtilage of his home under the test established by United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).

State v. Richard E. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, 7/14/14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2013AP1581-CR; majority by Prosser, dissent by Abrahamson (joined by Bradley); case activity (including briefs)

You’ve seen this before. An officer makes a traffic stop based on a “misunderstanding” of the law, then conducts a search and finds incriminating evidence.  Last July, in State v. Antonio Brown, SCOW held that a seizure based on such a mistake violates the 4th Amendment. Six months later, SCOTUS reached the opposite result in Heien v. North Carolina. In this case, SCOW overturns Brown to hold that: (1) “pretextual stops . . . are not per se unreasonable under the 4th Amendment”; (2) probable cause is never required for a traffic stop; (3) the officer here “misunderstood” multiple provisions of Ch. 346, but his mistakes were “objectively reasonable”; and (4) Article I §11 of Wisconsin’s Constitution extends no further than the 4th Amendment. Slip op. ¶¶ 4, 5, 6, 50.

State v. Patrick Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 7/10/2015, affirming a court of appeals per curiam decision, 2013AP430-CR, majority opinion by Prosser; concurrence by Ziegler, dissent by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

Sixteen seconds. It takes longer than that just to find your keys, get into your car, buckle up and start your engine. Keep that in mind as you read on. SCOW found that a traffic stop (due to a seatbelt violation) was unconstitutionally extended to perform field sobriety tests, but then upheld the subsequent vehicle search based on consent given 16 seconds after law enforcement told Hogan he was “free to leave.” SCOW saw no need to perform an attenuation analysis.

State v. Rachael A. Dickenson, 2015AP277-CR, District 2, 7/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The police didn’t enter the curtilage of Dickenson’s home or commit a trespass by walking up her driveway toward the back of her house.