On Point blog, page 56 of 141
SCOW: Extension of stop illegal, but seizure upheld based on consent given 16 seconds later
State v. Patrick Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 7/10/2015, affirming a court of appeals per curiam decision, 2013AP430-CR, majority opinion by Prosser; concurrence by Ziegler, dissent by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)
Sixteen seconds. It takes longer than that just to find your keys, get into your car, buckle up and start your engine. Keep that in mind as you read on. SCOW found that a traffic stop (due to a seatbelt violation) was unconstitutionally extended to perform field sobriety tests, but then upheld the subsequent vehicle search based on consent given 16 seconds after law enforcement told Hogan he was “free to leave.” SCOW saw no need to perform an attenuation analysis.
Driveway wasn’t part of curtilage; and officer didn’t trespass by walking down driveway to backyard
State v. Rachael A. Dickenson, 2015AP277-CR, District 2, 7/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The police didn’t enter the curtilage of Dickenson’s home or commit a trespass by walking up her driveway toward the back of her house.
Multiple challenges to OAR conviction rejected
State v. Robert C. Blankenheim, 2015AP239-CR, District 2, 7/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Blankenheim’s challenges his OAR conviction by arguing that he was unlawfully stopped, that the evidence wasn’t sufficient to prove operation on a highway, and that the police officer wasn’t a credible witness. The court of appeals disagrees “on all points….” (¶1).
Court has no “inherent” power to apply cash seized at time of arrest to pay costs, restitution
State v. Tommy Lee Branch, 2015 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court had no authority to order cash seized from Branch on his arrest to be used to pay court obligations because there was no basis for concluding the money was not subject to return under § 968.20. As the court of appeals puts it, the cash Branch had at the time of his arrest was no different from any other personal property he had when arrested. “Had [Branch] been wearing a $200 Stetson hat, a $300 Gucci belt, or a pair of $500 Allen Edmonds shoes, the State would not be allowed to seize those items of personal property and sell them on eBay to pay Branch’s debts.” (¶10).
Officer’s mistake of fact about car’s make and model didn’t invalidate stop
State v. Nathan Lewis Teasdale, 2015AP338-CR, District 4, 6/25/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer reasonably suspected that Teasdale was violating § 341.61(2), which prohibits displaying on a registration plates that are not issued for that vehicle, even though the officer was mistaken in believing that the make and model of the car was different from the make and model of the car for which the plates were issued.
Transcript of municipal court hearing doesn’t provide evidence supporting stop or refusal
Town of Bloomfield v. Petko Zvetkov Barashki, 2015AP226, District 2, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In a case the court of appeals aptly describes as “unusual,” the court exercises its discretionary power of reversal under § 752.35 to throw out Barashki’s OWI 1st conviction and refusal finding on the grounds that the evidence doesn’t show the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Barashki.
SCOTUS: Ordinance allowing police inspection of hotel registry is facially unconstitutional
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, USSC No. 13-1175, 2015 WL 2473445 (June 22, 2015), affirming 738 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
A majority of the Supreme Court holds that a Los Angeles ordinance compelling hotel operators to make their guest registries available to police for inspection on demand is facially unconstitutional because it penalizes the hoteliers for declining to turn over their records without affording them any opportunity to obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply. Along the way, the Court clarifies that “facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not categorically barred or especially disfavored” (slip op. at 4), clarifying language from Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), that some courts have read as barring facial challenges to statutes under the Fourth Amendment.
The 4th Amendment: Persona Non Grata in SCOW?
The 4th Amendment has been described by Conservative HQ as “one of the most important arrows in the quiver against bullying big government.” Because the government doesn’t just search and seize paper–it also goes after your cell phones, your Facebook account, your email (even when stored on Google’s server), your tweets, your DNA (by definition, your family’s DNA) etc.–we want a sturdy Fourth Amendment, right? Justice Scalia thinks so. He’s been called the 4th Amendment’s “
Traffic stop justified because officer saw driver drinking out of a brown bottle
State v. Timothy J. Relyea, 2014AP2860-CR, District 4, 6/18/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Put down that Sprecher® Root Beer if you’re behind the wheel! It could get you pulled over by a sharp-eyed cop who is knowledgable about the bottling practices of the beverage industry.
Police had probable cause to believe motorcyclist they located in a bar was intoxicated before he got to the bar
State v. Kirk L. Griese, 2015AP180, District 4, 6/18/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
There was probable cause to believe Griese was operating under the influence, even though the officer arrested Griese while he was having a Bacardi and Coke in the bar to which he had driven.