On Point blog, page 58 of 141
Discrepancy between officer’s testimony and written report doesn’t mean factual findings were clearly erroneous
State v. Andrew J. Joda, 2014AP1949 & 2014AP1950, District 2, 5/6/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Given the trial court’s conclusion that Deputy Becker’s testimony was more credible than Joda’s testimony, the court factual findings are not clearly erroneous just because there was a discrepancy between Becker’s testimony and his written report and Becker was unable to remember exactly where he was when he saw Joda make an illegal u-turn.
Totality of circumstances provided reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle
Langlade County v. Casey Joseph Stegall, 2014AP2369, District 3, 5/5/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Reasonable suspicion does not require the presence of certain facts, or a certain number of facts; rather, “what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience.” State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 424, 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1997). That “common sense test” was met here.
Detention in squad car wasn’t unreasonable and didn’t convert stop into arrest
State v. Richard S. Foley, 2014AP2601-CR, District 4, 4/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Detaining Foley in a squad car during a traffic stop was reasonable under the circumstances and didn’t transform the stop into an arrest.
Officers’ observations and information from other witnesses provided probable cause to arrest for OWI
State v. Zach Geyer, 2014AP2625-CR, District 4, 4/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Under the totality of the circumstances, police had probable cause to arrest Geyer for OWI.
Driver’s failure to stop after hitting a deer didn’t justify traffic stop
Village of Chenequa v. Chad C. Schmalz, 2015AP94-FT, District 2, 4/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The stop of Schmalz’s car was not supported by reasonable suspicion or justified by the community caretaker doctrine.
SCOTUS: Police cannot prolong a completed traffic stop to conduct dog sniff absent reasonable suspicion
Rodriguez v. United States, USSC No. 13-9972, 2015 WL 1780927 (April 21, 2015), reversing United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Some lower courts have held that police may briefly prolong a completed traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff. The Supreme Court rejects that approach, and holds that a seizure justified only by a traffic violation “‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” (Slip op. at 1, quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). Thus, prolonging a traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic infraction.
Police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop person in high crime area
State v. Jennifer L. Wilson, 2014AP2358-CR, District 3, 4/21/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A person’s presence in an area with frequent calls for drug activity and a suspected drug house is not, by itself, enough to justify an investigative stop of the person; the police must have particularized information that the person might be engaged in criminal activity. Police lacked that kind of particularized information in this case, so the stop was unlawful.
State v. Charles V. Matalonis, 2014AP108-CR, petition for review granted 4/17/15
Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (composed by On Point):
Did the community caretaker rule authorize police to conduct a “protective sweep” of a home even though the person who needed assistance had already been identified and transported to a hospital for treatment?
Telephonic warrant for OWI blood draw satisfied § 968.12(3)
State v. Roberto F. Orozco-Angulo, 2014AP1744-CR, District 2, 4/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The procedure used to obtain a telephonic search warrant for a blood draw following Orozco-Angulo’s arrest for OWI and his refusal to submit to a blood test complied with the requirements of § 968.12(3) and therefore suppression of the evidence was not appropriate.
Detention by security guards doesn’t count as part of prolonged stop
County of Winnebago v. Joshua R. Hunter, 2014AP2628, 4/1/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs
Hunter sought suppression of evidence supporting his conviction for OWI, and with a prohibited alcohol concentration, because law enforcement detained him for an unlawful length of time. His motion failed based on the court of appeals’ reading of the not-so-clear testimony at the suppression hearing.