On Point blog, page 61 of 141
SCOW applies good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to pre-McNeely blood draws, addresses exigency needed to justify a warrentless blood draw
State v. Cassius A. Foster, 2014 WI 131, 12/26/14, affirming a court of appeals summary disposition; majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity
State v. Alvernest Floyd Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, 12/26/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity
State v. Michael R. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, 12/26/14, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity
In these three cases, the supreme court addresses two issues arising from Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013): If a blood draw was conducted before McNeely in reliance on State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), does the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule mean the test results should not be suppressed? And, if the dissipation of alcohol by itself doesn’t constitute exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw, what circumstances do establish such an exigency? Foster and Kennedy hold that the good-faith exception applies to pre-McNeely searches. Tullberg addresses the second question.
Warrantless entry to home wasn’t justified under community caretaker rule
State v. Charles V. Matalonis, 2014AP108-CR, District 2/4, 12/23/14 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 4/17/15; case activity
The warrantless search of Matalonis’s home, which led to the discovery of marijuana, was not justified under the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement because there was no reasonable basis to believe there was an injured person in the home.
Unauthorized entry to apartment building’s secure parking garage didn’t violate Fourth Amendment
State v. Brett W. Dumstrey, 2015 WI App 5, petition for review granted 3/16/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 3; case activity
The court of appeals holds that the warrantless, nonconsensual entry by police into Dumstrey’s apartment complex parking garage was not unreasonable because the area was not part of the curtilage of Dumstrey’s home. The court also holds that any trespass by the police didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment because the garage wasn’t a constitutionally protected area. But a dissenting judge concludes prior Wisconsin case law establishes the garage was part of the curtilage and that the police conduct was unreasonable.
No seizure where officer approached and talked to person without display of authority or command
State v. Joseph S. Cali, 2014AP493-CR, District 2, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Applying the recent decision in County of Grant v. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, 356 Wis. 2d 343, 850 N.W.2d 253, the court of appeals holds that Cali wasn’t seized when a police officer, thinking Cali might be lost, pulled his squad car near Cali without activating his lights, got out and approached Cali, and from “normal talking distance” asked Cali “what was going on, if I could help him with anything.” (¶¶2-3).
Identifiable informants provided sufficient information to justify traffic stop
State v. Peter J. Long, 2014AP707-CR, District 2, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The police acted reasonably in stopping Long under an “attempt to locate” (ATL) that was based on information from identifiable persons as well as on Long’s own statements, and the officers’ manner in stopping him did not convert the stop into an arrest.
Police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop car for leaving scene of a reportable accident
State v. Cody J. Nolan, 2014AP1359-CR, District 3/4, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The police did not have reasonable suspicion to believe the red car Nolan was driving had been involved in a reportable accident and was leaving the scene or was assisting others in leaving the scene of a reportable accident in violation of § 346.70(1) or (1m)(b), as there was no evidence supporting a reasonable belief the alleged accident involved sufficient property damage to make it reportable under the statute.
Facts as found by circuit court supported probable cause to arrest for OWI
City of Chippewa Falls v. Douglas M. Buchli, 2014AP1422, District 3, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
There was probable cause to arrest Buchli for OWI despite the fact the police investigation discovered inconsistent information—including an admission by Buchli’s companion, Mahoney, that she was driving.
Police had reasonable suspicion to detain and probable cause to administer PBT
State v. Aaron J. Fuchs, 2014AP1041-CR, District 4, 12/18/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In assessing reasonable suspicion to detain Fuchs, police properly considered an allegation that Fuchs had been acting in “a violent and intoxicated” manner at a wedding reception before his contact with police; and based on all the circumstances, police had sufficient basis to administer a PBT.
Police had sufficient basis to conduct stop and frisk
State v. Terrell D. Cobbs, 2014AP501-CR, District 2, 12/17/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Police had reasonable suspicion to stop Cobbs and two companions and to conduct the pat-down search of Cobbs during which police discovered, opened, and searched Cobbs’ cigarette box, which contained marijuana.
SCOTUS: A police officer’s reasonable mistake of law may give rise to reasonable suspicion that justifies an investigatory stop
Heien v. North Carolina, USSC No. 13-604, 2014 WL 7010684 (December 15, 2014), affirming State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Rejecting the position taken by Wisconsin and the clear majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, the Supreme Court holds that a reasonable mistake of law may give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory seizure under the Fourth Amendment. While a statement of the Court’s holding is simple, its decision doesn’t fully articulate how courts are to determine when a mistake of law is “reasonable,” leading the sole dissenting Justice (Sotomayor) to predict lower courts will have difficulty applying the Court’s decision.