On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Steven L. Kaulfuerst, 2014AP1428-CR, District 2, 12/10/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The pat-down search of Kaulfuerst was lawful because police had probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct, even though police had not arrested him for that offense.

State v. David C. Marker, 2014AP1122-CR, District 2, 12/10/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The stop of the vehicle Marker was driving was justified under the community caretaker exception because, based on a call from Marker’s ex-wife, police had reason to believe Marker was driving while intoxicated with his children in the vehicle.

Questions presented:

1.  Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody.

2.  Whether it was clearly established that, even where an exception to the warrant requirement applied, an entry into a residence could be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment by reason of the anticipated resistance of an armed and violent suspect within.

State v. Ashley L. Eirich, 2014AP1901-CR, District 2, 11/26/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Saying that “[t]raining and experience do not turn police officers into drug-detection canines,” the court of appeals holds that probable cause to search a vehicle based on the odor of raw marijuana did not extend to a search of the bill compartment of the driver’s wallet.

City of Portage v. Kenneth D. Cogdill, 2014AP1492, District 4, 11/20/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had probable cause to believe Cogdill had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant based on the statements of witnesses, the officers’ own observations, and Cogdill’s statements.

State v. Jennifer M. Parisi, 2014 WI App 129; case activity

The warrantless entry into Parisi’s apartment was lawful because police had probable cause to believe the apartment contained evidence of a crime and there were exigent circumstances justifying entry without a warrant.

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by Hogan’s petition for review):

1. When a person is illegally detained by law enforcement for a period of time and then is verbally released by the officers for a comparatively very brief period of time before being re-approached by the officer(s), when is the time of the officers’ disengagement of the person properly regarded as a brief interruption of the illegal detention and when should the disengagement be regarded as the end of one stop and the start of a second stop?

State v. Kelly M. Rindfleisch, 2014 WI App 121; case activity

Just how “particular” must a warrant to search a Gmail and Yahoo! Mail be in order to survive the Fourth Amendment’s “particularity” requirement? And does the answer change when the warrant is for searching the email accounts of someone other than the person suspected of the crime described in the warrant? In this split opinion the majority upheld broad search warrants requiring Google and Yahoo to turn over email expected to show that one former Walker aide had committed a crime, but which showed that the account owner (another former Walker aide) had also committed a crime.

Jeremy Carroll v. Andrew Carman, et ux., USSC No. 14-212, 11/10/14 (per curiam), reversing and remanding Carman v. Carroll, 749 F.3d 192 (3rd Cir. 2014); docket

A police officer being sued under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Fourth Amendment doesn’t lose qualified immunity as a matter of law because he went to the back door of the plaintiff’s home instead than the front door, as it is not clearly established that an officer doing a “knock and talk” must go the front door.

State v. Arik James Ulwelling, 2014AP814-CR, District 3, 11/4/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had probable cause to stop Ulwelling for violating § 346.14(1), which prohibits motor vehicle operators from following another vehicle “more closely than is reasonable and prudent”—i.e., tailgating.