On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

Questions presented:

(1) Whether facial challenges to ordinances and statutes are permitted under the Fourth Amendment; and

(2) Whether a hotel has an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel guest registry where the guest-supplied information is mandated by law and an ordinance authorizes the police to inspect the registry, and if so, whether the ordinance is facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment unless it expressly provides for pre-compliance judicial review before the police can inspect the registry.

Question presented:

Does a felony conviction extinguish all of a defendant’s property interests in a firearm, such that he or she may not even arrange for the sale or other transfer of any surrendered or seized firearms to another person because doing so would constitute “constructive” possession and thus violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s ban on possession of a firearm?

Dane County v. Joshua H. Quisling, 2013AP2743, 10/16/14, District 4, (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying the “community caretaker” doctrine, the court of appeals held that a police officer was justified in stopping Quisling’s car based upon an informant’s tip that he was suicidal.  Evidence obtained after the stop need not be suppressed, and Quisling’s OWI conviction stands.

State v. Jessica Ann Stofflet, 2014AP823-CR, 10/16/14, District 4 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals held that the officer who stopped Stofflet’s vehicle and conducted a preliminary breath test had probable cause to believe she was committing OWI.

The officer observed that she had deviated within her lane, swerved over the fog line, varied her speed, swerved into the left lane,

State v. Deborah K. Salzwedel, 2014AP301-CR, 10/16/14, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Salzwedel’s motion to suppress and her conviction for OWI (3rd offense). Apparently, a deputy was driving right behind Salzwedel when she made a quick left turn in front of him without using her turn signal.  The court of appeals held that the deputy had probable cause to stop her vehicle for a violation of §346.34(1)b,

State v. Daniel S. Iverson, 2014AP515-FT, 10/9/14, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 1/16/15; reversed, 2015 WI 101; case activity

Iverson won a motion to suppress and dismissal of his first OWI.  He prevailed again on appeal.  Turns out the state trooper did not stop Iverson on suspicion of OWI.  He initiated the stop because he observed a cigarette butt being tossed from the passenger side of Iverson’s Jeep, which is neither a crime nor a traffic violation.  Thus, traffic stops based on non-traffic forfeiture offenses are illegal.

State v. Robert A. Harris, 2014AP965-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was reasonable suspicion that Harris was operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated and the length of Harris’s detention was not unreasonable.

Justin P. Brandl, 2014AP1036-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Even though police did not see any traffic violations or erratic driving, the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion and made the stop of Brandl’s motorcycle lawful.

State v. Jeramy J. Qualls, 2014AP141-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Without resolving the burning issue of whether ash from a cigarette violates the Village of Pleasant Prairie’s littering ordinance, the court of appeals holds that a police officer lawfully stopped Qualls’s car because he had reason to believe someone in the car threw a cigarette out the window.

Question presented:

This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are de minimis intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.