On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Jennifer M. Parisi, 2014 WI App 129; case activity

The warrantless entry into Parisi’s apartment was lawful because police had probable cause to believe the apartment contained evidence of a crime and there were exigent circumstances justifying entry without a warrant.

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by Hogan’s petition for review):

1. When a person is illegally detained by law enforcement for a period of time and then is verbally released by the officers for a comparatively very brief period of time before being re-approached by the officer(s), when is the time of the officers’ disengagement of the person properly regarded as a brief interruption of the illegal detention and when should the disengagement be regarded as the end of one stop and the start of a second stop?

State v. Kelly M. Rindfleisch, 2014 WI App 121; case activity

Just how “particular” must a warrant to search a Gmail and Yahoo! Mail be in order to survive the Fourth Amendment’s “particularity” requirement? And does the answer change when the warrant is for searching the email accounts of someone other than the person suspected of the crime described in the warrant? In this split opinion the majority upheld broad search warrants requiring Google and Yahoo to turn over email expected to show that one former Walker aide had committed a crime, but which showed that the account owner (another former Walker aide) had also committed a crime.

Jeremy Carroll v. Andrew Carman, et ux., USSC No. 14-212, 11/10/14 (per curiam), reversing and remanding Carman v. Carroll, 749 F.3d 192 (3rd Cir. 2014); docket

A police officer being sued under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Fourth Amendment doesn’t lose qualified immunity as a matter of law because he went to the back door of the plaintiff’s home instead than the front door, as it is not clearly established that an officer doing a “knock and talk” must go the front door.

State v. Arik James Ulwelling, 2014AP814-CR, District 3, 11/4/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had probable cause to stop Ulwelling for violating § 346.14(1), which prohibits motor vehicle operators from following another vehicle “more closely than is reasonable and prudent”—i.e., tailgating.

Questions presented:

(1) Whether facial challenges to ordinances and statutes are permitted under the Fourth Amendment; and

(2) Whether a hotel has an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel guest registry where the guest-supplied information is mandated by law and an ordinance authorizes the police to inspect the registry, and if so, whether the ordinance is facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment unless it expressly provides for pre-compliance judicial review before the police can inspect the registry.

Question presented:

Does a felony conviction extinguish all of a defendant’s property interests in a firearm, such that he or she may not even arrange for the sale or other transfer of any surrendered or seized firearms to another person because doing so would constitute “constructive” possession and thus violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s ban on possession of a firearm?

Dane County v. Joshua H. Quisling, 2013AP2743, 10/16/14, District 4, (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying the “community caretaker” doctrine, the court of appeals held that a police officer was justified in stopping Quisling’s car based upon an informant’s tip that he was suicidal.  Evidence obtained after the stop need not be suppressed, and Quisling’s OWI conviction stands.

State v. Jessica Ann Stofflet, 2014AP823-CR, 10/16/14, District 4 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals held that the officer who stopped Stofflet’s vehicle and conducted a preliminary breath test had probable cause to believe she was committing OWI.

The officer observed that she had deviated within her lane, swerved over the fog line, varied her speed, swerved into the left lane,

State v. Deborah K. Salzwedel, 2014AP301-CR, 10/16/14, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Salzwedel’s motion to suppress and her conviction for OWI (3rd offense). Apparently, a deputy was driving right behind Salzwedel when she made a quick left turn in front of him without using her turn signal.  The court of appeals held that the deputy had probable cause to stop her vehicle for a violation of §346.34(1)b,