On Point blog, page 68 of 142
SCOTUS: A warrant is required to search a cell phone seized incident to arrest
Riley v. California, USSC No. 13-132 (together with United States v. Wurie, USSC No. 13-212), 2014 WL 2864483 (June 25, 2014), reversing People v. Riley, No. D059840 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2013) (unpublished) (and affirming United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)); Scotusblog case page (which includes links to briefs and commentary) and symposium page (additional opinion commentary)
In a sweeping and significant ruling, a unanimous Supreme Court holds that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting such a search of a cell phone found on a defendant at the time of his or her arrest.
Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life[.]” ... The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant. (Slip op. at 28).
City failed to prove gun was used in commission of a crime, so it must be returned to owner
Aaron v. Ols v. City of Milwaukee, 2013AP1882, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Ols is entitled to the return of his firearm under § 968.20 because there is insufficient evidence that Ols used the firearm in the commission of a crime.
Police had probable cause to arrest for OWI despite lapse between time of driving and time of police contact
State v. Dale F. Wendt, 2014AP174, District 2, 6/18/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The information known to the deputy at the time he requested Wendt to take a blood test provided probable cause to believe Wendt had driven his vehicle while intoxicated earlier that evening, despite the deputy’s lack of information as to whether Wendt drank during the time that lapsed between his driving and his contact with the deputy.
Exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into apartment; officer’s earlier steps past the threshold “irrelevant”
State v. Cordarol M. Kirby, 2014 WI App 74; case activity
The court of appeals holds that “while exigent circumstances may justify entry, the fact that entry has already been made does not necessarily invalidate reliance on the exigent circumstances doctrine.” (¶22). Thus, because in this case there were exigent circumstances justifying police entry into an apartment to locate a backpack the police believed contained firearms, it “does not matter” that an officer had earlier stepped over the threshold of the apartment door to converse with people inside.
Dad was not “innocent owner” of the car daughter used to sell drugs
State v. One 2010 Nissan Altima, 2013AP2176, District 2, 6/11/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Daughter’s possession of and control over a car titled and registered in her father’s name made her the “owner” of the car for purposes of the property forfeiture law, so the circuit court properly rejected her father’s claim that he was the “innocent owner.”
Swerving in lane and “apparently” touching center line provides basis for traffic stop
State v. Alberta R. Rose, 2013AP2783-CR, District 2, 6/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A police officer’s observations of a car “smoothly swerving three or four times” in its lane of travel over several blocks and then “appear[ing] to strike the center line” (¶2) provided reasonable suspicion to perform a valid investigatory stop of the car, even though an enhanced version of the squad car video showed the car didn’t hit the center line.
Police lawfully extended stop of person driving a car owned by revoked driver
State v. Joshua D. Winberg, 2013AP2661-CR, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The driver of a car stopped based on officer’s knowledge that the car owner’s license was revoked was not unlawfully seized because, even thought it was immediately apparent the car owner was not driving, the police also immediately observed additional suspicious information that justified the continued detention of the driver.
State v. Gary Monroe Scull, 2011AP2956-CR, petition for review granted 5/22/14
On review of published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
Did the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule apply to a search of a home conducted in reliance on a search warrant that was itself based on a search by a drug-sniffing dog that violated Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013)?
Implied consent law covering drivers not arrested for OWI is constitutional; defendant’s consent to blood draw was voluntary
State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity
The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.
Police officers who entered and searched home and seized firearm–all without a warrant– are not civilly liable
Krysta Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, No. 12-2272 (7th Cir. May 9, 2014)
Nine hours after obtaining a § 51.15 emergency detention order, Milwaukee police officers forcibly entered Sutterfield’s home without a warrant, opened a locked container, and seized the handgun and concealed carry licenses that were in the container. Sutterfield filed a civil rights suit against them, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirms in a long (76-page) decision with plenty to digest, even though it declines to resolve some of the constitutional issues raised because they were not preserved or fully argued. The court does conclude the entry was justified because the police reasonably believed Sutterfield was going to harm herself. And the court assumes the search of the closed container and seizure of the gun were unlawful, but holds the officers are immune from civil liability.