On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

Review of published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

When the passenger of a car asks a police officer searching the car if he has “got a warrant for that?” before the officer opens a briefcase found in the hatchback of the car, has the driver’s general consent to search the car been limited?

For more factual background about this an interesting and novel issue in Wisconsin,

Review of unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (from the state’s Petition for Review)

Whether the court of appeals went beyond the boundaries of an appellate court when it reversed the trial court’s decision based on a sua sponte argument–and subsequent appellate factual determinations–that was never presented to the trial court.

Purtell was on probation for animal cruelty convictions, and as a condition of probation was allowed access to computers only for school or work.

State v. Steven L. Udelhofen, 2013AP1244-CR, District 4, 11/14/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s findings of fact regarding the circumstances of the stop of Udelhofen are not clearly erroneous despite the fact that he squad car video didn’t corroborate all the details of the officer’s testimony regarding his observations, applying State v. Walli, 2011 WI App 86,

State v. Jack E. Johnson, 2013 WI App 140; case activity

As part of their investigation of Johnson’s involvement in a homicide, Wisconsin police wanted to search Johnson’s rented residence in Rosarito, Mexico. They contacted FBI Special Agent Eckel, the U.S. liaison between Mexican and American law enforcement authorities. Eckel called a liaison in Mexico and told him that United States law enforcement authorities wanted to search Johnson’s residence and needed to make sure the search was lawfully conducted so any evidence found could be used in an American court.

Sun Prairie v. Brent D. Curry, 2013AP1206, District 4, 11/7/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had reasonable suspicion to stop Curry, who was driving on a residential street at 3:40 a.m., turned around, sped past the officer’s car, and then turned at a high rate of speed into the driveway of a residence. He then sat in the car for a few minutes before getting out and walking up the driveway;

State v. Nick A. Lutter, 2012AP2586, District 4, 10/31/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s findings of fact at the suppression hearing were not clearly erroneous, and they supported the court’s conclusion there was reasonable suspicion to stop Lutter. Among other reasons for the stop, the state trooper cited Lutter’s crossing the fog line twice and driving onto the fog line once.

State v. Sandra Biancardi, 2013AP1351, District 2, 10/30/13 (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Biancardi was convicted of OWI.  On appeal she argued that police unlawfully stopped her based on an uncorroborated, anonymous tip contrary to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).  The court of appeals, citing State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶24, 301 Wis. 2d 1,

State v. Roland Derliel Graham, 2013AP440-CR, District 1, 12/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Reasonable suspicion for seizing defendant

¶15      We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances described by [Officer] Wiesmueller, there was reasonable suspicion to stop Graham. Graham was stopped on property that had been the subject of DEA and police surveillance for suspected drug activity. Earlier on the day of Graham’s arrest,

State v. Kari L. Schiewe, 2012AP2767-CR, District 4, 10/24/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying well-established principles the court of appeals holds that despite the lack of field sobriety tests or other additional investigatory steps there was probable cause to arrest Schiewe for OWI based on information from witnesses and the officer’s own observations of Schiewe at her home. (¶¶14-19). Further, the subsequent blood draw from Schiewe was not tainted by the fact that the police arrested Schiewe in her garage,

Jackson County v. Robert J. Troka, 2013AP317, District 4, 10/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A police officer lawfully stopped a car traveling in the opposite direction that flashed its high beams at the officer twice, once within about a half mile of the officer, the second time within about 200 feet of the officer, even though the officer’s high beams were not on.