On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

Village of DeForest v. Lynn J. Braun, 2011AP2116, District 4, 3/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Braun: Robert Nagel; case activity

Stop for driving under the influence unsupported by reasonable suspicion:

¶11      I likewise conclude that there were insufficient facts before Officer Schaefer which could lead him to reasonably suspect that Braun was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant.  

State v. Jermaine Kennard Young, 2010AP2959-CR, District 1, 3/6/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Young: Robert N. Meyeroff; case activity

Reasonable suspicion existed to justify investigative stop of Young, based on a tip from confidential informant that someone matching Young’s description would be at a specified time and place to sell drugs.

¶13      When determining the reliability of a CI’s tip,

State v. Sherri A. Wittrock, 2011AP1538-CR, District 2, 2/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wittrock: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

¶7        Where, as here, an officer relies on information provided by dispatch, “reasonable suspicion is assessed by looking at the collective knowledge of police officers.”  See State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5,

State v. Jordan T. Griffith, 2011AP2226-CR, District 2, 2/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Griffith: Walter Arthur Piel, Jr.; case activity

¶5        In order for an investigatory stop to be justified by reasonable suspicion, the officer must have a “‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.”  State v. Walli, 2011 WI App 86,

State v. Terrence T. Boyd, 2012 WI App 39 (recommended for publication); for Boyd: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Because Boyd’s car was registered in a state (Illinois) that issues two plates, car could be stopped for failing to display a plate on the front, in violation of § 341.15(1) (“[w]henever 2 registration plates are issued for a vehicle, one plate shall be attached to the front and one to the rear of the vehicle.”).

on review of published opinion; for Anagnos: Barry S. Cohen; case activity; prior post

Traffic Stop – Reasonable Suspicion – OWI Refusal Hearing Challenge to Arrest

Issues (composed by On Point): 

1. Whether the officer could lawfully stop Anagnos’ vehicle for failing to use a turn signal where neither traffic nor pedestrians were present, § 346.34(1)(b).

2. Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Anagnos’

U.S. v. Antoine Jones, USSC No. 10-1259, 1/23/12, affirming United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010); effectively overruling State v. Sveum, 2009 WI App 81, ¶8

The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

Town of Mukwonago v. John J. Uttke, 2011AP2021, District 2, 1/18/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Uttke: Michael C. Witt; case activity

Uttke’s driver’s license was revoked for refusal to submit to a blood test upon OWI arrest, and he requested a “refusal hearing,” unsuccessfully challenging the existence of probable cause to arrest, § 343.305(9). The court of appeals affirms:

¶9        We first address whether Officer Heckman had probable cause to arrest Uttke.  

State v. Gary A. Senger, 2011AP1950-CR, District 2, 1/18/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Senger: Robert C. Raymond; case activity

Applying the test described in State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 94-95, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999) for extending a traffic stop, the court concludes that the officer had reasonable suspicion to administer FSTs following a stop for driving with a revoked license.

State v. Joseph J. Wilcenski, 2013 WI App 21; case activity

Conditions of pre-trial release – alcohol treatment and testing; constitutionality

Waukesha County has adopted a policy that all persons arrested for OWI as a second or subsequent offense who live in one of ten counties be released from custody on the condition that they participate in a “pretrial intoxicated driver treatment program.” Wilcenski argues that this condition violates the constitutional rights to medical privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches.