On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

Question Presented: 

Whether a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection dog is a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause?

Scotusblog Page

Florida supreme court decision, State v. Jardines (4/14/11)

Coverage by Lyle Denniston, Orin Kerr (“fun stuff for Fourth Amendment nerds”), Kent Scheidegger (“This is solid police work”), 

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Gracia: Tracey A. Wood; case activity; petition for review granted 5/14/12

Warrantless Entry – Community Caretaker 

Entry into Gracia’s bedroom by police, who had linked him to a serious traffic accident, was justified by the community caretaker doctrine; State v. Ultsch, 2011 WI App 17, 331 Wis. 2d 242,

State v. Luke T. Nirmaier, 2011AP1355-CR, District 3, 12/28/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nirmaier: Michael M. Rajek; case activity

The odor of alcohol on Nirmaier following a traffic accident resulting in substantial bodily injury triggered the implied consent law, notwithstanding absence of probable cause to arrest at that point:

¶9        Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(3) outlines different scenarios in which an officer may invoke the implied consent law and request a chemical test of an individual’s breath,

State v. Jason E. Goss, 2011 WI 104, affirming court of appeals summary order;  for Goss: Daniel J. Chapman; case activity

¶2   We are asked to determine whether the officer’s request for the PBT breath sample was made in violation of Wis. Stat. § 343.303, which states that an officer “may request” a PBT breath sample “[i]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the person is violating or has violated s.

State v. Kenneth M. Sobczak, 2012 WI App 6 (recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 6/13/12; for: Sobczak: Ryan J. Hetzel; case activity

¶6        The issue in this case is whether the girlfriend—as a guest in Sobczak’s parents’ home—had the authority to consent to the officer’s entry into the Sobczak residence and to the search and seizure of Sobczak’s laptop.[1]  We hold that she did

State v.

State v. Anthony D. Guard, 2012 WI App 8 (recommended for publication); for Guard: Richard L. Zaffiro; case activity

Warrantless Entry – Duplex, Common Hallway

Guard, a resident of a duplex upper flat, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hallway by which his unit was accessed, such that warrantless police entry into that hallway without consent or exigent circumstances violated the fourth amendment; factors enunciated by State v.

on review of summary opinion; for Miller: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Terry Stop – Reasonable Suspicion

Issue (composed by On Point): 

Whether information obtained from a jail inmate and other, anonymous sources established reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.

Neither the court of appeals summary order nor Miller’s petition for review is available on-line. The briefs filed in the court of appeals indicate that Miller’s car was stopped after the police received information that he was transporting drugs.

County of Calumet v. Daniel A. Ryan, 2011AP490, District 2, 12/14/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Ryan: John M. Carroll; case activity

Officers, investigating a one-car accident, approached Ryan’s home, knocked on his door and “(a)fter several minutes of ‘back and forth,’ Ryan came out of his residence” (admittedly “voluntarily”). Subsequent testing revealed him to be intoxicated and he was convicted of OWI.

State v. Brian S. Wold, 2011AP1518-CR, District 2, 12/14/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wold: Patrick A. Dewane, Jr.; case activity

Report from a named, citizen informant that a particular vehicle was “driving all over the roadway” was sufficiently reliable to support traffic stop for OWI, even though after spotting the vehicle, the officer followed it for a mile without himself observing any traffic violations. 

State v. William A. Grantham, 2010AP2693-CR, District 3, 12/13/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Grantham: Peter C. Rotter; case activity

Search warrant, for thermal imaging device use against residence, passes muster even if labeled “order.”

¶5        Grantham acknowledges that our supreme court has concluded, “An order meeting the parameters of a search warrant set out in [Wis. Stat. § 968.12(1)][2] is a statutorily authorized warrant,