On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Anthony D. Guard, 2012 WI App 8 (recommended for publication); for Guard: Richard L. Zaffiro; case activity

Warrantless Entry – Duplex, Common Hallway

Guard, a resident of a duplex upper flat, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hallway by which his unit was accessed, such that warrantless police entry into that hallway without consent or exigent circumstances violated the fourth amendment; factors enunciated by State v.

on review of summary opinion; for Miller: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Terry Stop – Reasonable Suspicion

Issue (composed by On Point): 

Whether information obtained from a jail inmate and other, anonymous sources established reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.

Neither the court of appeals summary order nor Miller’s petition for review is available on-line. The briefs filed in the court of appeals indicate that Miller’s car was stopped after the police received information that he was transporting drugs.

County of Calumet v. Daniel A. Ryan, 2011AP490, District 2, 12/14/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Ryan: John M. Carroll; case activity

Officers, investigating a one-car accident, approached Ryan’s home, knocked on his door and “(a)fter several minutes of ‘back and forth,’ Ryan came out of his residence” (admittedly “voluntarily”). Subsequent testing revealed him to be intoxicated and he was convicted of OWI.

State v. Brian S. Wold, 2011AP1518-CR, District 2, 12/14/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wold: Patrick A. Dewane, Jr.; case activity

Report from a named, citizen informant that a particular vehicle was “driving all over the roadway” was sufficiently reliable to support traffic stop for OWI, even though after spotting the vehicle, the officer followed it for a mile without himself observing any traffic violations. 

State v. William A. Grantham, 2010AP2693-CR, District 3, 12/13/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Grantham: Peter C. Rotter; case activity

Search warrant, for thermal imaging device use against residence, passes muster even if labeled “order.”

¶5        Grantham acknowledges that our supreme court has concluded, “An order meeting the parameters of a search warrant set out in [Wis. Stat. § 968.12(1)][2] is a statutorily authorized warrant,

State v. John R. Nelson, 2011AP125-CR, District 2, 12/7/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nelson: John A. Nelson; case activity

The officer’s observation that Nelson’s vehicle intruded “somewhat into the intersection” before stopping provided reasonable suspicion for a stop-sign violation, § 346.46(1). The stop wasn’t unnecessarily prolonged by summoning a drug dog while the officer ran record checks and issued a warning ticket.

State v. Damon Keith Sutton, 2012 WI App 7 (recommended for publication); for Sutton: Maayan Silver; case activity

Reasonable Suspicion – “Frisk,” of Vehicle

Reasonable suspicion supported “protective search” of Sutton’s van following routine traffic stop: While the officer ran a document check, Sutton remained in the van. The officer discerned “distinct rocking motions,” which the officer’s training and experience informed her represented “someone who may be trying to retrieve or conceal a weapon.”

State v. Michael P. Parizanski, 2011AP395, District 2, 11/30/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Parizanski: Andrew Mishlove; case activity

Seizure of motorist who had parked by the side of a road, leading to an OWI arrest, was supported by community caretaker rationale as informed by State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.

State v. Gustavo E. Lopez, 2011AP1037-CR, District 2, 11/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Lopez: Walter Arthur Piel, Jr.; case activity

¶8        While the record reveals that Lopez is correct in stating that the court took video evidence from the roadside stop into consideration when making the finding of probable cause, we disagree that this was in any way not allowed. When determining the facts available to the officer to formulate probable cause,

State v. Herbert L. Hamilton, 2011AP1325-CR, District 4, 11/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Hamilton: Dixie Lippit; case activity

Although driver in single-car accident didn’t exhibit signs commonly associated with intoxication, the smell of alcohol on his breath coupled with his loss of control of the car provided probable cause to administer a preliminary breath test under § 343.303:

¶15      First,