On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Jenny L. Nowak, 2010AP1499-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nowak: Keith F. Ellison; case activity

Warrantless entry into Nowak’s garage was justified under hot pursuit doctrine, given “probable cause to believe Nowak committed a jailable offense—specifically, resisting by failure to stop,” § 346.17(2t) (punishable by 9 months imprisonment), ¶15. (Citing, State v. Richter,

State v. Deshon C. Matthews, 2011 WI App 92 (recommended for publication); for Matthews: Paul G. Bonneson; case activity

Terry Stop – Reasonable Suspicion

Reasonable suspicion supported stop of Matthews, when police on patrol saw him wearing a ski mask and hoodie late at night in a high-crime area near a woman who was walking away form him and who appeared to be frightened.

Kentucky v. Hollis Deshaun King, USSC No. 09-1272, 5/16/11, reversing, King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649 (2010)

The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement (here, imminent destruction of evidence) isn’t circumscribed by whether the exigency was “police-created.”

It is well established that “exigent circumstances,” including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant.

Columbia County v. Fred A. Ederer, 2010AP2369, District 4, 5/12/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Ederer: John Smerlinski; case activity

Ederer’s no contest plea waived his right to appeal suppression issue in this OWI-1st (therefore, civil) case. His reliance on County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 275-76, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995) (court should consider 4-factor test in determining whether to impose waiver bar) is misplaced:

¶5        Ederer acknowledges that Quelle was partially overruled on other grounds by Washburn County v.

State v. Jeffrey D. Walli, 2011 WI App 86 (recommended for publication); for Walli: Chad A. Lanning; case activity

Trial court factual findings made from a combination of live testimony and video evidence are reviewed deferentially, under the “clearly erroneous” standard of review; the court rejects de novo review of the video recording. Here, it is a police squad video of a traffic stop, with the officer testifying (and the trial court finding) that Walli in fact crossed the center line,

State v. Calvin Jerome Pirtle, 2011 WI App 89(recommended for publication); for Pirtle: Christopher J. Cherella; case activity

Consent to Search – Georgia v. Randolph

Pirtle’s failure to object to the police presence allowed them to act on the co-tenant’s consent to a warrantless search under Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006):

¶15      In Randolph,

State v. Andrew R. Reierson, 2010AP596-CR, District 4, 4/28/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Reierson: John Smerlinski; case activity

The officer’s erroneous reading of Reierson’s license plate, causing the officer to wrongly believe that his registration had expired, nonetheless supported stop of the car under the good-faith rule.

¶11      We conclude the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress because the officer had probable cause to stop Reierson for operating with an expired registration,

State v. Allen L. Resch, 2010AP2321-CR, District 2, 4/27/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Resch: Christopher Lee Wiesmueller, Corinne N. Wiesmueller; case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported investigatory stop for possible burglary, where vehicle was parked in private business parking lot at 2:26 a.m., with engine running and lights off.

¶13      Specifically, as the trial court indicated, the time of day is an important factor in determining whether a law enforcement officer had a reasonable suspicion. 

State v. Ralph H. Davis, 2011 WI App 74 (recommended for publication); for Davis: Chandra N. Harvey, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Warrantless Entry – Curtilage – Implied Invitation Doctrine

¶9      The protections of the Fourth Amendment extend beyond the walls of the home to the “curtilage.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). “[C]urtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a [person]’s home and the privacies of life,

on petition for review of summary order; for Goss: Daniel J. Chapman; case activity

Issue (formulated by On Point:

Whether probable cause of intoxication to administer a preliminary breath test under § 343.303 was shown by the smell of alcohol on the driver along with four prior OWI convictions.

The catch: with 4 priors, Goss’s legal blood alcohol content limit would have been .02. Given that greatly reduced threshold,