On Point blog, page 1 of 1
Warrantless arrest on porch unlawful, but probable cause to arrest means no suppression
State v. Kallie M. Gajewski, 2020AP7-CR, District 3, 8/2/22 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police arrested Gajewski in the curtilage of her home without a warrant and exigent circumstances. While this makes the arrest unlawful, the evidence obtained from the arrest is not subject to suppression because police had probable cause to arrest her.
Identifiable informants provided sufficient information to justify traffic stop
State v. Peter J. Long, 2014AP707-CR, District 2, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The police acted reasonably in stopping Long under an “attempt to locate” (ATL) that was based on information from identifiable persons as well as on Long’s own statements, and the officers’ manner in stopping him did not convert the stop into an arrest.
Police had reasonable suspicion to detain and probable cause to administer PBT
State v. Aaron J. Fuchs, 2014AP1041-CR, District 4, 12/18/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In assessing reasonable suspicion to detain Fuchs, police properly considered an allegation that Fuchs had been acting in “a violent and intoxicated” manner at a wedding reception before his contact with police; and based on all the circumstances, police had sufficient basis to administer a PBT.
Court of appeals rejects use of collective knowledge doctrine to undercut reasonable suspicion
City of Stevens Point v. Katrina L. Shurpit, Appeal No. 2013AP538, 9/26/13; (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Shurpit challenged the investigative stop that led to her convictions for operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content and while under the influence of an intoxicant. A hit-and-run had a occurred in the vicinity a few minutes before her stop. The dispatcher told the arresting officer that the car involved was gray or green.
Reasonable Suspicion: Stop of Auto (Flight from Scene of Reported Trespass; “Guzy” Factors; Collective Knowledge Doctrine)
State v. Carl Rissley, 2012 WI App 112 (recommended for publication); case activity
Reasonable suspicion supported Terry stop to investigate possible crime. Homeowner called police to report early-morning confrontation with possible trespasser, who then took flight in van at high rate of speed, and officer stopped vehicle matching description within five minutes of report:
¶13 All of this occurred just before 3:00 a.m. When a citizen is confronted in his driveway by an unknown stranger at this time in the morning,
Reasonable Suspicion – Collective Knowledge Doctrine; Traffic Stop – Report of Intoxicated Driver
State v. Sherri A. Wittrock, 2011AP1538-CR, District 2, 2/15/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wittrock: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
¶7 Where, as here, an officer relies on information provided by dispatch, “reasonable suspicion is assessed by looking at the collective knowledge of police officers.” See State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5,
Reasonable Suspicion / Probable Cause – OWI – Collective Knowledge Doctrine
State v. Bridgette M. Glaze, 2010AP3128-CR, District 2, 8/24/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Glaze: John C. Orth; case activity
Although Glaze’s stop by one officer investigating possible domestic violence was likely unsupported (¶9), the stop was adequately supported by an alternative basis: observations of a second, off-duty officer which, under the “collective knowledge” doctrine were imputed to the first officer and supplied reasonable suspicion that Glaze was driving while intoxicated.
State v. Sameeh J. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5, reconsideration denied
court of appeals decision; for Pickens: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate
Reasonable Suspicion for Detention and “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine
Although, “under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect,” the state must prove those underlying facts. “Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer,” ¶¶12-13.
Reasonable Suspicion – Stop – Basis – “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine
State v. Bruce E. Black, 2000 WI App 175, 238 Wis.2d 203, 617 N.W.2d 210
For Black: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether the “collective knowledge” doctrine applies when the information in the possession of one police officer is not in fact communicated to another officer.
Holding: ¶17 n. 4:
(I)n order for the collective-information rule to apply, such information must actually be passed to the officer before he or she makes an arrest or conducts a search.