On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

State v. Ashley L. Monn, 2019AP640-CR, 9/9/20, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

When police executed an arrest warrant for a man at his trailer home, they found Monn there too. They cuffed her, conducted a protective search, confirmed she had no outstanding warrants, and told her she would be released without charges. Unfortunately, she asked to get her purse from the trailer.

State v. Heather Jan VanBeek, 2019AP447, 8/12/20, District 2; certification granted 9/16/2020; case activity (including briefs)

VanBeek was sitting with a companion in her parked truck when an officer approached. There’d been a tip that people were sitting in the truck for an hour and that someone had come to the truck with a backpack, then departed. The officer asked a few questions, got satisfactory answers, and then asked for ID, purportedly for his report of the contact. The truck’s occupants were reluctant to hand over their licenses, but the officer insisted, and they did. He held onto them for more than five minutes and summoned a drug dog, who eventually alerted. At some point in this time frame, reasonable suspicion developed, but it wasn’t present when the officer took the IDs. So, was the encounter, at that point, “consensual” (as the state argues) or were the truck’s occupants seized–which, without reasonable suspicion, would be unconstitutional?

State  v. Catherine Cuskey Large, 2019AP1966-CR, 8/13/20, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication; case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals correctly affirmed the circuit court’s decision to suppress OWI evidence in this case, where an officer admitted that the New Glarus Police Department’s “protocol” was to administer PBTs on motorists whether they had probable cause for OWI or not. But court of appeals did so by taking a heavy-handed approach to waiver, a rule of administration that appellate courts have the discretion to apply or not.

State v. Christopher J. Vaaler, 2019AP2174, 8/6/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer pulled Vaaler over in the very early morning for not having his headlights on. Per the court of appeals, Vaaler’s unusual manner of speech, the odor of intoxicants, and the fact of an open beer next to him were enough for the officer to conduct the OWI investigation that ultimately led to Vaaler’s arrest and conviction:

State v. Michael Thomas Martell, 2019AP927-CR, District 3, 7/21/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer located and started following Martell’s SUV after getting dispatchers relayed a tip describing a vehicle driving erratically. What the officer saw provided reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.

State v. Courtney C. Brown, 2020 WI 63, 7/3/20, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2017AP774-CR, case activity (including briefs)

“Supreme Court affirms wide discretion in traffic stops; dissent says implicit bias will go unchecked” That’s the JSOnline’s pithy description of SCOW’s 4-1 decision in this case. Also noteworthy, Justice R.G. Bradley filed a strident, bias-denying concurring opinion suggesting that court of appeals Judge Reilly should be disciplined for writing a strident, bias-acknowledging concurrence that dared to criticize two recent 4th Amendment decisions from SCOW.

State v. Michelle Greenwood, 2019AP248, 6/9/20, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

Greenwood was pulled over for going 81 when the speed limit was 70. The officer testified her eyes were glassy and bloodshot and that her pupils were quite dilated, and did not constrict quickly when he shined his flashlight on them. Per the court of appeals, this was good enough to continue to detain her after the speeding was addressed in order to investigate suspected marijuana intoxication.

State v. Donald Simon Mullen and County of Waukesha v. Donald Simon Mullen, 2019AP1187 & 2019AP1188, 5/20/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mullen pulled his car into a bar parking lot around 1:30 a.m. and a passing officer took interest. He pulled into the lot also, and parked behind and to the left of Mullen’s parked vehicle–Mullen had exited and was standing near the closed bar’s front door. The officer pointed at Mullen an “extremely high intensity spotlight” which serves a “disabling function”–preventing the illuminated person from seeing an approaching officer–and approached him on foot, asking where he was coming from. Was Mullen seized by the time he responded in an incriminating way?

State v. Jeffrey I. Quitko, 2019AP200-CR, District 3, 5/12/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Quitko’s motion to suppress evidence obtained following his traffic stop for speeding violation should have been granted because law enforcement lacked probable cause to request that he submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT).

State v. David William Krumm, 2019AP243-CR, District 3, 5/5/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under § 343.303 and County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999), there was probable cause to believe Krumm was operating while intoxicated, so police could request he submit to a preliminary breath test.