On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

State v. Michelle Greenwood, 2019AP248, 6/9/20, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

Greenwood was pulled over for going 81 when the speed limit was 70. The officer testified her eyes were glassy and bloodshot and that her pupils were quite dilated, and did not constrict quickly when he shined his flashlight on them. Per the court of appeals, this was good enough to continue to detain her after the speeding was addressed in order to investigate suspected marijuana intoxication.

State v. Donald Simon Mullen and County of Waukesha v. Donald Simon Mullen, 2019AP1187 & 2019AP1188, 5/20/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mullen pulled his car into a bar parking lot around 1:30 a.m. and a passing officer took interest. He pulled into the lot also, and parked behind and to the left of Mullen’s parked vehicle–Mullen had exited and was standing near the closed bar’s front door. The officer pointed at Mullen an “extremely high intensity spotlight” which serves a “disabling function”–preventing the illuminated person from seeing an approaching officer–and approached him on foot, asking where he was coming from. Was Mullen seized by the time he responded in an incriminating way?

State v. Jeffrey I. Quitko, 2019AP200-CR, District 3, 5/12/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Quitko’s motion to suppress evidence obtained following his traffic stop for speeding violation should have been granted because law enforcement lacked probable cause to request that he submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT).

State v. David William Krumm, 2019AP243-CR, District 3, 5/5/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under § 343.303 and County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999), there was probable cause to believe Krumm was operating while intoxicated, so police could request he submit to a preliminary breath test.

State v. Larry Alexander Norton, 2019AP1796-CR, 4/14/20, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In which the occupant of a legally parked car becomes the object of police scrutiny, for very little apparent reason, and all is found to be copacetic under the Fourth Amendment.

Kansas v. Glover, USSC No. 18-556, 2020 WL 1668283, 4/6/20, reversing State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64 (Kan. 2018); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a self-described “narrow” decision, the Supreme Court holds that, in the absence of information negating the inference that the owner was driving, a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a car based on the fact the registered owner of the car had a revoked driver’s license.

United States v. Terrill A. Rickmon, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 19-2054, 3/11/20

Police stopped a vehicle because it was emerging from the source of a ShotSpotter alert. The 7th Circuit holds that the totality of the circumstances gave the officer responding to the scene reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop.

State v. Kelly C. Richardson, 2019AP1650-CR, District 2, 3/11/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police received a tip that Richardson appeared to be drunk while at a bank at 11:30 a.m. She left and drove to a Wal-Mart to shop. As she returned to her car, a sergeant approached and questioned her. He observed that she smelled of alcohol, slurred her speech, and had glassy eyes. He arrested her and she was charged with OWI 3rd and pleaded no contest.

State v. Bartosz Mika, 2019AP1488, District 2, 2/19/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion in continuing Mika’s refusal hearing so the state could call another witness, and the testimony of the additional witness established police had reasonable suspicion to stop Mika.

State v. Jacqueline A. Ziriax Anderson, 2018AP2410-CR, District 3, 2/11/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state offered Anderson a deal: plead to OWI 2nd and it would recommend the minimum mandatory penalties. The state made that offer because the arresting officer had resigned from the department due to some “mental health issues” and the prosecutor apparently wasn’t eager to call him as a witness. Anderson’s lawyer found this out immediately before Anderson entered her plea—but didn’t tell Anderson. She learned about it afterward. (¶¶3-4, 8-11). While trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to tell Anderson that information before she pled, that doesn’t entitle her to plea withdrawal because she fails to show she would have insisted on going to trial if trial counsel would have told her, as required by State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 312, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).