On Point blog, page 23 of 59
Stop of SUV reasonable due to malfunctioning stop lamp
State v. James A. Webb, 2015AP1613-CR, 3/22/16, District 1 (-1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals here reverses a suppression order and holds that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Webb’s SUV because its high-mount stop light was not working while the driver was braking. During the stop, officers discovered that Webb was carrying a concealed weapon without a permit.
Weaving within lane, other circumstances supported traffic stop
Columbia County v. Stephen M. Kokesh, 2015AP1650, District 4, 3/10/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The totality of the circumstances—the driving observed by the officer and the time of the driving—provided reasonable suspicion stop Kobkesh’s car, despite Kokesh’s creative attempt to show otherwise.
Object found during frisk could be removed from pocket
State v. Steve C. Deterding, 2015AP195-CR, 3/10/16, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer lawfully removed the object he felt in Deterring’s pants pocket during a lawful pat-down for weapons.
Court of appeals sees no problem with initiation or duration of traffic stop
State v. John D. Arthur Griffin, 2015AP1271-CR, 3/3/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals finds that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the car Griffin was driving and, even though that suspicion dissipated during the encounter, that the continued detention of Griffin was reasonable.
Stop of car OK based on license restriction of one of the two registered owners
State v. Drew A. Heinrich, 2015AP1524-CR, District 4, 2/25/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The stop of the car Heinrich was driving was reasonable under State v. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, 306 Wis. 2d 193, 742 N.W.2d 923, because one of the two owners of the car had an occupational license and the vehicle was being operated outside the times allowed by that license.
Seeing driver holding cellphone didn’t justify stop for texting while driving
United States v. Gregorio Paniagua-Garcia, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2540, 2/18/16
The stop of Paniagua-Garcia for texting while driving was unlawful because the officer had no basis for concluding Paniagua-Garcia was using his cellphone to send a text or email as opposed to using it in some way that isn’t prohibited.
Quick acceleration, weaving in lane not enough to justify stop
City of West Allis v. Teresa A. Michals, 2015AP1688 & 2015AP1689, District 1, 1/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Michals was operating while intoxicated or in a “disorderly manner” in violation of a city ordinance.
Six miles of “jerky” weaving + 3:00 a.m. = reasonable suspicion
Columbia County v. Brittany N. Krumbeck, 2015AP1010, 1/14/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634, our supreme court rejected the notion that “repeated weaving” within a lane, without more, amounts to reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Krumbeck invokes Post to attack her OWI conviction but the court of appeals concludes there were enough other facts to justify the stop.
Officer had reasonable suspicion for traffic stop; possible “mistake of law” was reasonable
Village of Bayside v. Ryan Robert Olszewski, 2015AP1033-34; 1/12/15; District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity, including briefs
After Heien v. North Carolina and State v. Houghton, everyone predicted lots of litigation about law enforcement’s “reasonable mistakes of law” during traffic stops. This case marks the beginning of it.
Passenger’s apparent distress supported stop of car
State v. Tommy K. Miller, 2015AP1211-CR, District 4, 12/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The seizure of Miller’s car was justified under the community caretaker doctrine because the officer’s observations led him to believe Miller’s passenger was in distress. Having lawfully seized the car, the officer’s subsequent discoveries gave him reason to ask Miller to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs) and submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT).