On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

State v. Terrell D. Cobbs, 2014AP501-CR, District 2, 12/17/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had reasonable suspicion to stop Cobbs and two companions and to conduct the pat-down search of Cobbs during which police discovered, opened, and searched Cobbs’ cigarette box, which contained marijuana.

Heien v. North Carolina, USSC No. 13-604, 2014 WL 7010684 (December 15, 2014), affirming State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Rejecting the position taken by Wisconsin and the clear majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, the Supreme Court holds that a reasonable mistake of law may give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory seizure under the Fourth Amendment. While a statement of the Court’s holding is simple, its decision doesn’t fully articulate how courts are to determine when a mistake of law is “reasonable,” leading the sole dissenting Justice (Sotomayor) to predict lower courts will have difficulty applying the Court’s decision.

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by Hogan’s petition for review):

1. When a person is illegally detained by law enforcement for a period of time and then is verbally released by the officers for a comparatively very brief period of time before being re-approached by the officer(s), when is the time of the officers’ disengagement of the person properly regarded as a brief interruption of the illegal detention and when should the disengagement be regarded as the end of one stop and the start of a second stop?

Dane County v. Joshua H. Quisling, 2013AP2743, 10/16/14, District 4, (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying the “community caretaker” doctrine, the court of appeals held that a police officer was justified in stopping Quisling’s car based upon an informant’s tip that he was suicidal.  Evidence obtained after the stop need not be suppressed, and Quisling’s OWI conviction stands.

State v. Daniel S. Iverson, 2014AP515-FT, 10/9/14, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 1/16/15; reversed, 2015 WI 101; case activity

Iverson won a motion to suppress and dismissal of his first OWI.  He prevailed again on appeal.  Turns out the state trooper did not stop Iverson on suspicion of OWI.  He initiated the stop because he observed a cigarette butt being tossed from the passenger side of Iverson’s Jeep, which is neither a crime nor a traffic violation.  Thus, traffic stops based on non-traffic forfeiture offenses are illegal.

State v. Robert A. Harris, 2014AP965-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was reasonable suspicion that Harris was operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated and the length of Harris’s detention was not unreasonable.

Justin P. Brandl, 2014AP1036-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Even though police did not see any traffic violations or erratic driving, the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion and made the stop of Brandl’s motorcycle lawful.

State v. Jeramy J. Qualls, 2014AP141-CR, District 2, 10/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Without resolving the burning issue of whether ash from a cigarette violates the Village of Pleasant Prairie’s littering ordinance, the court of appeals holds that a police officer lawfully stopped Qualls’s car because he had reason to believe someone in the car threw a cigarette out the window.

Question presented:

This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are de minimis intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.

State v. Micah J. Snyder, 2013AP299-CR, 10/2/14, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Based on County of Grant v. Vogt, decided just 2 months ago, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s decision to grant Snyder’s suppression motion in this OWI case. The court of appeals held that Snyder was not “seized” when a trooper parked his squad car face-to-face with Snyder’s car, approached Snyder on foot while carrying a flashlight, and then questioned him through a car window.