On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

State v. Travis Daniel Thom, 2014AP613-CR, District 3, 9/9/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A police officer reasonably assumed a car was being driven by the owner where there was no additional information suggesting someone else was driving.

State v. Deborah K. Salzwedel, 2014AP301-CR, District 4, 9/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s finding that Salzwedel’s act of turning without signaling affected the movement of other traffic was not clearly erroneous, and therefore the officer had a reasonable basis to stop Salzwedel for violating § 346.34(1)(b).

State v. Jeanmarie Carini, 2014AP526-CR, District 2, 8/27/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was reasonable cause to believe Carini was driving while impaired and therefore police properly asked her to submit to a preliminary breath test.

State v. Robert J. Kowalis, 2014AP258, District 2, 8/6/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s refusal finding under § 343.305(9) is upheld because the officer had probable cause to arrest Kowalis for operating while intoxicated.

City of Bloomer v. James S. Frank, 2013AP2597, District 3, 8/5/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion in reopening suppression hearing to take additional evidence in the form of dispatch recordings which the city tried, but failed, to obtain before the suppression hearing in the case.

State v. Bradley Edward Magdzas, 2014AP250-CR, District 3, 8/5/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The police had reasonable suspicion to stop Magdzas and, once he was stopped, could reasonably ask him for his name and identification.

County of Grant v. Daniel A. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, 7/18/14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

“Although we acknowledge that this is a close case, we conclude that a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave.” (¶3).

State v. Antonio D. Brown, 2014 WI 69, 7/16/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity

Another defense victory!  Police stopped  Brown’s car due to an alleged violation of §347.13(1), which prohibits the operation of a vehicle at night unless its tail lamps are in “good working order.”  In a 4-3 decision, the majority holds that the police here misunderstood the statute, so the stop was illegal.  Furthermore, a stop based upon an officer’s mistake of law, is unlawful, and the results of the ensuing search must be suppressed. Justice Prosser, dissenting, predicts the majority’s interpretation will be “a bonanza for litigants seeking to challenge motor vehicle stops.” ¶79.

State v. Penny S. Rosendahl, 2014AP349-CR, District 2 (1-judge opinion, inelgible for publication); case activity

¶8        When the evidence includes disputed testimony from the arresting officer and a video showing events leading up to the arrest, the circuit court’s findings of fact are subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard.  State v. Walli, 2011 WI App 86, ¶14, 334 Wis. 2d 402, 799 N.W.2d 898.  Here, the deputy’s testimony was that Rosendahl’s vehicle weaved within its lane and crossed the center line.  The circuit court found that the video showed that Rosendahl’s vehicle touched the center line on three occasions.  We have reviewed the record and conclude that the circuit court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.

City of Antigo v. M.K., 2013AP2627, District 3, 7/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court held there was reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle M.K. was driving because the court found the officer knew the vehicle’s registration was expired before he made the stop. The court’s finding of fact was not clearly erroneous, even though the officer’s testimony was equivocal as to whether he learned that fact as part of the original dispatch or after he spotted the vehicle and called in the license plate.