On Point blog, page 32 of 59
“High crime area”; “recognizing police presence”; “security adjustment”: Buzz phrases not enough to justify Terry stop
State v. Patrick E. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44; case activity
The circuit court’s findings—Gordon was in a high-crime area; he and his friends “recognized the police presence”; and, as a result, Gordon engaged in a “security adjustment,” which is “a conscious or unconscious movement that an individual does when they’re confronted by law enforcement when they’re typically carrying a weapon” and involves placing a hand over the place the gun is to make sure it’s still there (¶¶3-7,
Even if officer’s opening of vehicle door was an unreasonable search, evidence obtained would have inevitably been discovered
State v. Mitchell M. Treiber, 2013AP2684-CR, District 3, 3/11/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The inevitable discovery doctrine, which provides that “evidence obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means,” State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 427, 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct.
Taking defendant from site of stop to nearby police station didn’t turn stop into an arrest
State v. Michael J. Adrian, Jr., 2013AP1890-CR, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Transporting Adrian from the site his vehicle was stopped to the nearest police station for the purpose of performing field sobriety tests did not convert a lawful Terry detention into an illegal custodial arrest.
A person temporarily detained under Terry may be moved “in the general vicinity of the stop without converting what would otherwise be a temporary seizure into an arrest.” State v.
Officer had reasonable suspicion to continue detention and administer field sobriety tests
Marquette County v. Randy S. Tomaw, 2013AP1510, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Tomaw was going 17 miles over the speed limit at 1:20 on a Sunday morning. He did not appear to respond to the officer’s initial attempt at contact, his upper body swayed as he walked to the rear of his vehicle, and the officer detected the “strong odor” of alcohol on his breath.
Officer’s approaching person on street and engaging him in conversation wasn’t a seizure
State v. Keith R. Friederick, 2013AP1609, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Friederick was not seized by officer who approached him on the street and said sought to talk to him, applying United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), along with State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶53, 236 Wis.
Even if field sobriety tests constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, police may request them based on reasonable suspicion of impairment
Village of Little Chute v. Ronald A. Rosin, 2013AP2536, District 3, 2/25/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rosin argues that field sobriety tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment because “[a]n inherent right as a human being is to control and coordinate the actions of [his or her] own body[,]” and, therefore “a fundamental expectation of privacy is implicated when a person is subject to the performance of [field sobriety tests].” (¶12).
Police lacked reasonable suspicion to seize driver of car in a parking lot suspected to be the site of illegal drug activity
State v. Chonsea Jerome King, 2013AP1068-CR, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
A police officer saw a car parked in a lot linked by “numerous [pieces of] intelligence” to illegal drug activity. It was 9:25 p.m. The officer watched it for about five minutes, but did not see anyone exit the vehicle or any activity outside the vehicle, though they did observe the interior lights in the car turn on and off “a couple [of] times.” (¶3).
Totality of circumstances supported stop, arrest for robbery
State v. Lamont C., 2013AP1687, District 1, 2/11/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
¶14 We conclude under the facts in this case that [Officer] Hoffman did have reasonable suspicion … to stop … Lamont C. Hoffman, relying on information provided to him by a robbery victim, located Lamont C. within minutes of the robbery. In the limited time Hoffman was able to speak with the victim,
Reading old implied consent form didn’t taint admissibility of blood test results
State v. Lawrence A. Levasseur, Jr., 2013AP2369-CR, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The arresting officer used an implied consent form that pre-dated the 2009 amendments to § 343.305, so it omitted language about accidents involving death or serious injury–language that did not apply to Levasseur’s situation. The use of the outdated form didn’t strip the resulting blood test result of its statutory presumption of admissibility and accuracy,
Boater in canal lock wasn’t seized when officer on the lock wall engaged him in conversation
State v. Javier Teniente, 2013AP799-CR, District 4, 1/30/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Teniente was on his boat in the chamber of Madison’s Tenney Locks waiting for the water to rise. Piqued by Teniente’s boisterous behavior, an officer standing on the wall of the lock engaged Teniente in conversation. (¶¶3-4, 15). This interaction wasn’t a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes;