On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

State v. Michael J. Adrian, Jr., 2013AP1890-CR, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Transporting Adrian from the site his vehicle was stopped to the nearest police station for the purpose of performing field sobriety tests did not convert a lawful Terry detention into an illegal custodial arrest.

A person temporarily detained under Terry may be moved “in the general vicinity of the stop without converting what would otherwise be a temporary seizure into an arrest.” State v.

Marquette County v. Randy S. Tomaw, 2013AP1510, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Tomaw was going 17 miles over the speed limit at 1:20 on a Sunday morning. He did not appear to respond to the officer’s initial attempt at contact, his upper body swayed as he walked to the rear of his vehicle, and the officer detected the “strong odor” of alcohol on his breath.

State v. Keith R. Friederick, 2013AP1609, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Friederick was not seized by officer who approached him on the street and said sought to talk to him, applying United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), along with State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶53, 236 Wis. 

Village of Little Chute v. Ronald A. Rosin, 2013AP2536, District 3, 2/25/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rosin argues that field sobriety tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment because “[a]n inherent right as a human being is to control and coordinate the actions of [his or her] own body[,]” and, therefore “a fundamental expectation of privacy is implicated when a person is subject to the performance of [field sobriety tests].” (¶12).

State v. Chonsea Jerome King, 2013AP1068-CR, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

A police officer saw a car parked in a lot linked by “numerous [pieces of] intelligence” to illegal drug activity. It was 9:25 p.m. The officer watched it for about five minutes, but did not see anyone exit the vehicle or any activity outside the vehicle, though they did observe the interior lights in the car turn on and off “a couple [of] times.” (¶3).

State v. Lamont C., 2013AP1687, District 1, 2/11/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

¶14      We conclude under the facts in this case that [Officer] Hoffman did have reasonable suspicion … to stop … Lamont C. Hoffman, relying on information provided to him by a robbery victim, located Lamont C. within minutes of the robbery. In the limited time Hoffman was able to speak with the victim,

State v. Lawrence A. Levasseur, Jr., 2013AP2369-CR, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The arresting officer used an implied consent form that pre-dated the 2009 amendments to § 343.305, so it omitted language about accidents involving death or serious injury–language that did not apply to Levasseur’s situation. The use of the outdated form didn’t strip the resulting blood test result of its statutory presumption of admissibility and accuracy,

State v. Javier Teniente, 2013AP799-CR, District 4, 1/30/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Teniente was on his boat in the chamber of Madison’s Tenney Locks waiting for the water to rise. Piqued by Teniente’s boisterous behavior, an officer standing on the wall of the lock engaged Teniente in conversation. (¶¶3-4, 15). This interaction wasn’t a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes;

State v. Dartanian Lemont Lewis, 2013AP454-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Lewis was a passenger in a car stopped for safety belt violations. During the stop he was frisked, leading to the discovery of cocaine. He argued the frisk was improper because § 347.48(2m)(gm) prohibits police from taking an individual into physical custody solely for failing to wear a safety belt.

State v. Chad Allen Nelson, 2013Ap1926-CR, District 3, 1/22/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Scene: The parking lot of Frosty’s Outpost, on County Road H in rural Bayfield County, 2:00 a.m. Police get a dispatch: Someone’s damaging a patron’s vehicle in the parking lot. Before an officer can respond dispatch sends an update: The suspects are bear hunters, and they left in a blue Dodge pickup with a hound box heading toward the bear camp west of Ino on Highway 2.