On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

State v. Sandra Biancardi, 2013AP1351, District 2, 10/30/13 (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Biancardi was convicted of OWI.  On appeal she argued that police unlawfully stopped her based on an uncorroborated, anonymous tip contrary to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).  The court of appeals, citing State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶24, 301 Wis. 2d 1,

State v. Roland Derliel Graham, 2013AP440-CR, District 1, 12/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Reasonable suspicion for seizing defendant

¶15      We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances described by [Officer] Wiesmueller, there was reasonable suspicion to stop Graham. Graham was stopped on property that had been the subject of DEA and police surveillance for suspected drug activity. Earlier on the day of Graham’s arrest,

Jackson County v. Robert J. Troka, 2013AP317, District 4, 10/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A police officer lawfully stopped a car traveling in the opposite direction that flashed its high beams at the officer twice, once within about a half mile of the officer, the second time within about 200 feet of the officer, even though the officer’s high beams were not on.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue  (composed by the State’s petition for review)

In determining the legality of a vehicle stop under the Fourth Amendment, did the court of appeals properly conclude that a tail lamp that is sixty-six percent functional is in “good working order” as required under Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) and thus cannot serve as a basis for an officer’s probable cause to stop the vehicle?

Review of unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Was Vogt seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when a police officer pulled up behind Vogt’s parked car, approached the car, rapped on the driver’s window, and directed Vogt to roll the window down?

Petitions for review aren’t available on the court’s website, so the issue statement is based on the brief filed in,

State v. Richard H. Hogenson, 2013AP389-CR, District 3, 10/15/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Though it is “a very close case” (¶14), the court of appeals holds an officer had reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop based on a burned-out headlamp and conduct field sobriety tests:

¶15      In this case, at the moment [Officer] Jenatscheck requested that Hogenson participate in field sobriety tests,

Question presented:

Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle?

Lower court opinion: People v. Lorenzo Prado Navarette, et al., No. A132353, 2012 WL 4842651 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2013) (unpublished)

Docket

Scotusblog page

This is a very significant Fourth Amendment case that could change the law in Wisconsin by limiting State v.

Manitowoc County v. Ryan A. Spatchek, 2013AP986, District 2, 9/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

An anonymous call to police dispatch said Spatchek was operating while intoxicated and that the caller was concerned for his safety and provided verifiable information as to Spatchek’s location  that was later confirmed by a deputy who subsequently found and followed Spatchek and made independent observations of his impaired driving (crossing the fog line approximately three times in one mile;

City of Stevens Point v. Katrina L. Shurpit, Appeal No. 2013AP538, 9/26/13; (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Shurpit challenged the investigative stop that led to her convictions for operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content and while under the influence of an intoxicant.  A hit-and-run had a occurred in the vicinity a few minutes before her stop.  The dispatcher told the arresting officer that the car involved was gray or green.

State v. Kenneth B. Burmeister, 2013AP1016-CR, District 3, 9/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police lawfully extended a traffic stop to conduct field sobriety tests because the odor of alcohol, the driver’s initial “deflective answer”  to the question of whether he had been drinking, and his subsequent admission to drinking gave the police reasonable suspicion to believe the driver was impaired:

¶11      We reject Burmeister’s assertion that the facts observed by Logan suggest only the presence of alcohol.