On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

State v. Richard H. Hogenson, 2013AP389-CR, District 3, 10/15/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Though it is “a very close case” (¶14), the court of appeals holds an officer had reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop based on a burned-out headlamp and conduct field sobriety tests:

¶15      In this case, at the moment [Officer] Jenatscheck requested that Hogenson participate in field sobriety tests,

Question presented:

Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle?

Lower court opinion: People v. Lorenzo Prado Navarette, et al., No. A132353, 2012 WL 4842651 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2013) (unpublished)

Docket

Scotusblog page

This is a very significant Fourth Amendment case that could change the law in Wisconsin by limiting State v.

Manitowoc County v. Ryan A. Spatchek, 2013AP986, District 2, 9/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

An anonymous call to police dispatch said Spatchek was operating while intoxicated and that the caller was concerned for his safety and provided verifiable information as to Spatchek’s location  that was later confirmed by a deputy who subsequently found and followed Spatchek and made independent observations of his impaired driving (crossing the fog line approximately three times in one mile;

City of Stevens Point v. Katrina L. Shurpit, Appeal No. 2013AP538, 9/26/13; (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Shurpit challenged the investigative stop that led to her convictions for operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content and while under the influence of an intoxicant.  A hit-and-run had a occurred in the vicinity a few minutes before her stop.  The dispatcher told the arresting officer that the car involved was gray or green.

State v. Kenneth B. Burmeister, 2013AP1016-CR, District 3, 9/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police lawfully extended a traffic stop to conduct field sobriety tests because the odor of alcohol, the driver’s initial “deflective answer”  to the question of whether he had been drinking, and his subsequent admission to drinking gave the police reasonable suspicion to believe the driver was impaired:

¶11      We reject Burmeister’s assertion that the facts observed by Logan suggest only the presence of alcohol.

State v. Tony L. Wyatt, 2013AP728-CR, District 2, 8/28/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A sheriff’s deputy stopped the car Wyatt was driving after checking the license plate of a car driving in front of the deputy and determining the car’s owner—a female—didn’t have a valid driver’s license. If the deputy didn’t know before the stop that the driver was male, the stop was lawful under State v.

State v. Kenneth C. House, 2013 WI App 111; case activity

House was stopped for operating with a suspended registration. After running House’s license and learning he was on probation for a drug offense, the officer returned House’s license and issued him a warning for the suspended registration. The officer then retrieved his police dog who, after sniffing around the vehicle, alerted on the driver and passenger doors.

Town of Freedom v. Matthew W. Fellinger, 2013AP614, District 3, 8/6/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Fellinger argues that field sobriety tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment because “[a]n inherent right as a human being is to control and coordinate the actions of [his or her] own body[,]” and, therefore “a fundamental expectation of privacy is implicated when a person is subject to the performance of [field sobriety tests].” (¶12).

State v. Ryan Erik Diggins, 2012AP526-CR, District 1, 7/30/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

There was no objectively reasonable suspicion that Diggins was loitering in violation of Milwaukee’s loitering ordinance, § 106-31(1), where Diggins was seen standing for five minutes, doing nothing, at a gas station– “a place to which the public is invited”–and then moved across the street to a bus stop–“another equally public place”–even though both places were in a high crime area:

¶13      Here,

State v. Michael E. Mauermann, 2012AP2568-CR, District 4, 7/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Iowa County Ordinance § 600.08 provides that “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle so as to make any loud, disturbing or unnecessary noise in or about any public street, alley, park or private residence which may tend to annoy or disturb another by causing the tires of said vehicle to squeal,