On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

State v. Dimitrius Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, reversing 2011 WI App 118; case activity

OWI – Refusal Hearing – Authority to Litigate Constitutionality of Traffic Stop 

Constitutionality of the traffic stop  may be raised as a defense at a refusal hearing, § 343.305(9)(a)5.a.

¶29  In this case, the relevant portion of the statute is found in sub. (9)(a)5.a.  That subsection permits circuit courts to consider “[w]hether the officer had probable cause to believe the person was driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol . 

State v. Joseph C. Miller, 2012 WI 61, affirming summary order; case activity

¶5   We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances police acted reasonably when they conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle that Miller was driving based on reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot.”[5]  We are confident that police had the requisite reasonable suspicion primarily based on the reliability of the final informant and the information provided by him.  

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Anderson: Dennis M. Melowski, Chad A Lanning; case activity

Traffic Stop 

Probable cause found to support stop for unsafe lane deviation, § 346.13(1).

¶12      Here, DeNovi testified that, while traveling in a group of three vehicles, he observed Anderson’s vehicle drift into the outside lane for approximately 100 yards and then swerve back to the inside lane.  

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Thomas: John M. Carroll; case activity

Traffic Stop – Duration 

¶8        Thomas argues Schellinger lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop because the only fact supporting Schellinger’s belief that Thomas was operating while intoxicated was the odor of intoxicants.  Thomas asserts the odor of intoxicants does not, by itself, constitute reasonable suspicion that a driver is operating while intoxicated.  

State v. Susan C. Macho, 2011AP1841-CR, District 2, 5/23/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Macho: Leonard G. Adent; case activity

¶8        In this case, Edwards’ actions in pulling up behind Macho and shining his spotlight into her car did not amount to a “show of authority sufficient to effect a seizure.”  Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶65 n.18.  

State v. Joel R. Medrow, 2011AP2314, District 1, 5/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Medrow: Chad A. Kanning; case activity

An anonymous call to the police reported that the caller had followed a possibly impaired driver who had turned parked in the front parking lot of the Cudahy Police Department; the report included the vehicle’s license plate number. The court concludes that, upon seeing Medrow just outside that vehicle,

County of Waukesha v. Thomas C. Groshek, 2011AP001371, District 2/4, 5/3/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Groshek: Thomas C. Simon; case activity

¶7        Deputy Smith was dispatched to a semi-rural area to investigate a report  that a motorcycle had been involved in an accident at approximately 1:30 a.m., around “bar time,” in the vicinity of a bar.  Smith was advised that following the accident,

State v. John E. Meddaugh, 2011AP237-CR, District 1, 5/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Meddaugh: Theodore Perlick Molinari; case activity

¶9        Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the circuit court that Sturino put forth specific, articulable facts which warranted the stop when considered with the inferences from those facts.  Sturino testified that shortly after hearing tires screech, he observed Meddaugh’s vehicle “fishtail.”  Fishtailing,

State v. Michael L. Frank, 2011AP2306, District 3, 4/10/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Frank: Robert A. Kennedy, Jr.; case activity

Information, provided by a 911 caller reporting observations about Frank’s erratic driving, provided a basis for a lawful stop.

17      In this case, we conclude that Judge lawfully stopped Frank based on Shatzer’s tip.[3]  A police officer may conduct a traffic stop if the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or if the officer has reasonable suspicion,

State v. Dawn M. Fletcher, 2011AP1356-CR, District 3, 3/27/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Fletcher: Earl J. Luaders, III; case activity

The court upholds search of a car following a drug dog alert which occurred while an officer was still processing a warning ticket for a conceded traffic violation:

¶7        On appeal, Fletcher concedes the initial stop was lawful.  She argues the dog sniff was illegal because the officer had no reasonable suspicion to detain the occupants of the vehicle to request a dog sniff.