On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

court of appeals decision; for Pickens: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Reasonable Suspicion for Detention and “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine
Although, “under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect,” the state must prove those underlying facts. “Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer,” ¶¶12-13.

court of appeals decision; for Conaway: Philip J. Brehm; for Griffin: Michael S. Murphy

Reasonable Suspicion for Traffic Stop, Excessive Window Tint, Generally

¶3    The window tint regulation at issue here is easily summarized. Rear window tinting is permitted only if the window allows at least 35% of light to pass through, except that the limitation does not apply to tinting done during the original manufacture of a vehicle. 

State v. Michael L. Popke, 2009 WI 37, reversing unpublished opinion
For Popke: John Miller Carroll, Aaron W. Schenk

Issue / Holding:

¶26      In the case at hand, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Similar to the specific and articulable facts observed by the officer in Post, the officer in this case made the following observations over the course of approximately one block at 1:30 a.m.: The defendant was driving with three-quarters of the vehicle left of the center of the road;

State v. Melvin Bridges, 2009 WI 66, PFR filed 5/18/09
For Bridges: Michael S. Holzman

Issue/Holding: Frisk of Bridges during routine traffic stop (defective brake lights) upheld, where the early-evening stop was in an area “where the police had received numerous complaints of gunshots fired at night,” and Bridges when pulled over had made “a questionable movement”; State v. Gary A. Johnson,

State v. Dennis E. Bailey, 2009 WI App 140
For Bailey: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue/Holding1: The police have authority to stop a vehicle for an equipment violation of an administrative code provision incorporated under local ordinance:

¶17      Wisconsin Stat. § 349.02(2)(a) and (b) expressly allow a police officer to stop a vehicle for violation of a statute or ordinance enacted under this chapter.

State v. Dennis E. Bailey, 2009 WI App 140
For Bailey: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue/Holding: Court upholds frisk of vehicle, following stop for minor equipment violation (excessive window tint) in high crime area, where driver made furtive gesture (kicking motions under front seat) and officer testified that he saw a bag, which he thought contained a gun, protruding from under seat, ¶¶24-50. State v. Gary A.

State v. Paul Anthony Butler, 2009 WI App 52, PFR filed 4/20/09
For Butler: Trisha R. Stewart Martin

Issue/Holding: “Frisk” of car supported by concern driver had gun, in that he was wearing an empty gun holster, ¶16.

State v. Tamara C. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, PFR filed 5/7/08
For Limon: Wm. Tyroler, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Lisa A. Packard, Law Student

Issue/Holding:

¶34      Here, the officers were outnumbered and without backup when, following an anonymous tip that drug dealing and drug loitering activities were taking place on the porch of a residence in a high-crime area, they approached Limon and two men.

State v. Aaron E. Applewhite, 2008 WI App 138, PFR filed 9/19/08
For Applewhite: Pamela Moorshead

Issue/Holding:

¶12      The next question before us is whether Bastil’s discovery of contraband in Applewhite’s pockets is supported by the “plain touch” doctrine. When the pat-down itself is based on reasonable suspicion, the “plain feel” or “plain touch” exception to the warrant requirement may apply, and “when an officer touches or feels an object during a pat[-]down which his or her training and experience lead the officer to believe may be contraband,

State v. Tamara C. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, PFR filed 5/7/08
For Limon: Wm. Tyroler, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Lisa A. Packard, Law Student

Issue/Holding:

¶36      In her final argument, Limon argues that when the officer opened her purse, the search exceeded the scope of a valid weapons frisk under Terry. Although Terry provides only for an officer “to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing … in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him,” id.