On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

State v. Isaac D. Taylor, 2019AP797-CR, District 2, 7/30/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The majority sees specific and articulable facts providing reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. The dissent sees a change in the state’s justification for the stop that sandbags the defense and turns the court of appeals into a fact finder.

State v. Keith J. Dresser, 2020AP2017, 7/22/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A sheriff’s deputy saw Dresser apparently unconscious in his vehicle in a Taco Bell parking lot at 5:00 a.m. The deputy pulled behind Dresser’s vehicle, turned on his emergency lights apparently based on departmental “procedures,” and knocked on the window. Dresser woke up, he and/or the deputy opened a car door, and ultimately Dresser was arrested for OWI.

State v. Anthony Francen Harris, 2019AP1908-CR, District 3, 7/30/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police stopped the car Harris was driving in part because Skenandore, an officer-in-training, misread the data on his in-squad computer screen and wrongly concluded that the car’s owner didn’t have a valid license. (¶¶2-3, 5-7). His mistake doesn’t matter because the officer’s other observations justified the stop.

State v. Heather Van Beek, 2021 WI 51, 2019AP447-CR, on certification from the court of appeals, 6/4/21; case activity (including briefs)

In a splintered opinion, a majority of SCOW holds that an officer does not necessarily “seize” a driver when he takes her license to run a records check. Seizure depends on the totality of the circumstances. In this case, a seizure occured when the officer continued holding a license and questioning the driver until a drug-sniff dog arrived. And the seizure was unlawful because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Roggensack wrote the majority opinion. The liberals joined some parts of it, and the remaining conservatives joined other parts.

State v. James Timothy Genous, 2021WI 50, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2019AP435-CR, 6/4/21; case activity (including briefs)

An officer saw Genous sit in a parked car, engine running and headlights on, in a residential neighborhood at 3:36 a.m.  A woman emerged from a house, entered the car for 10 to 15 seconds, and returned to the house.  Although the officer could not see what happened inside the car, the woman appeared to match the description of a female drug user who was known to live in the house. Plus the officer had heard that this area had a reputation for drug trafficking. In a 4-3 opinion, SCOW held that these facts gave the officer reasonable suspicion to stop Genous for possible drug dealing.

State v. Kimberly Dale Crone, 2021 WI App 29; case activity (including briefs)

Think twice before driving with medication in your car or purse. This decision (recommended for publication) holds that when a sheriff stops a driver for simple speeding, and he admittedly lacks reasonable suspicion to inquire about medication bottles he sees in the driver’s purse, he may nevertheless extend the stop to ask the driver to consent to a search of those bottles per State v. Wright, 2019 WI 45, 386 Wis. 2d 495, 926 N.W.2d 157 and Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).

Village of Grafton v. Elizabeth A. Wesela, 2020AP1416, District 2, 4/7/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wesela concedes police had reaonsable suspicion to make the initial stop of the car she was driving, but complains, fruitlessly, that the officer didn’t have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to conduct field sobriety tests or to ask for preliminary breath test.

State v. Avant Rondell Nimmer, 2020AP878-CR, petition for review granted 3/24/21; case activity (including links to briefs and PFR)

Issue presented (composed by On Point):

Did police responding to a ShotSpotter alert of shots fired have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Nimmer based on his proximity to the address in the alert so close to the alert and Nimmer’s response to the officer’s arrival on the scene?

Torres v. Madrid, USSC No. 19-292, 2021 WL 1132514, 3/25/21, reversing 769 Fed. Appx. 654 (10th Cir. 2019); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Fans of dueling citations to ancient cases will want to savor the entirety of the majority and the somewhat heated dissent in this case; the serjeants-at-mace shew their mace at one point. Everybody else just needs to know this: a police officer who applies physical force to the body of a person seizes that person if the objective circumstances show an intent to restrain. This seizure occurs during the application of that force even if the intended restraint doesn’t succeed; that is, if the person gets away. And that force can be communicated by means of a projectile, like a bullet.

State v. Shondrell R. Evans, 2020AP286-CR, District 4, 1/28/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Evans was seized under the Fourth Amendment when two police officers parked their marked squad cars in a way that restricted—though didn’t totally obstruct—his ability to drive away, shined their headlights and spotlights on his car, and exited their squad cars and approached Evans’s car. Because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Evans, the resulting search of his car was unlawful.