On Point: 1. Stops, in general

State v. Arturo Luiz-Lorenzo, 2015AP1540-CR, 5/18/2016, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police discovered cocaine on Luiz-Lorenzo as a result of his arrest; he challenges the grounds for the initial Terry stop.

United States v. Randy Johnson, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1366, 5/17/16

Taking Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), to its logical extreme, the Seventh Circuit holds that detaining the passengers in a car parked too close to a crosswalk was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

State v. John D. Arthur Griffin, 2015AP1271-CR, 3/3/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals finds that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the car Griffin was driving and, even though that suspicion dissipated during the encounter, that the continued detention of Griffin was reasonable.

United States v. Gregorio Paniagua-Garcia, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2540, 2/18/16

The stop of Paniagua-Garcia for texting while driving was unlawful because the officer had no basis for concluding Paniagua-Garcia was using his cellphone to send a text or email as opposed to using it in some way that isn’t prohibited.

Village of Bayside v. Ryan Robert Olszewski, 2015AP1033-34; 1/12/15; District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity, including briefs

After Heien v. North Carolina and State v. Houghton, everyone predicted lots of litigation about law enforcement’s “reasonable mistakes of law” during traffic stops. This case marks the beginning of it.

State v. Tommy K. Miller, 2015AP1211-CR, District 4, 12/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The seizure of Miller’s car was justified under the community caretaker doctrine because the officer’s observations led him to believe Miller’s passenger was in distress. Having lawfully seized the car, the officer’s subsequent discoveries gave him reason to ask Miller to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs) and submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT).

State v. John C. Martin, 2015AP597-CR, District 2, 9/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police searched a tavern bathroom for a person named in an arrest warrant; they found no one, but they did notice a strong odor of raw marijuana. Martin was the last person seen leaving the bathroom. Ergo, the police had reasonable suspicion to detain Martin and investigate whether he had drugs on him.

United States v. Rodolpho Hernandez Flores, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1515, 8/19/15 (per curiam)

Hernandez Flores was stopped for driving with an obstructed license plate because his rear plate was affixed to his car by a standard frame that covered the plate’s periphery. The stop violated the Fourth Amendment because it was based on an unreasonable mistake of law regarding the statute governing the display of license plates.

State v. Emiliano Calzadas, 2015AP162-CR, District 4, 9/3/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer stopped the vehicle Calzadas was driving because registered owner—who was female—had a suspended driver’s license; but immediately after stopping the car the officer realized Calzadas was male and thus not the registered owner. Even if the reason for the stop dissipated when the officer learned that Calzadas was not the registered owner, the officer’s request for and verification of Calzadas’s identification did not transform what was initially a lawful stop into an unreasonable seizure.

Columbia County v. Jessica N. Johnson, 2015AP332, District 4, 8/27/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to extend Johnson’s detention and ask her to do field sobriety tests based on additional information he gleaned after the initial contact with Johnson. State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 93-95, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999), applied.