On Point: 1. Stops, in general

State v. Chonsea Jerome King, 2013AP1068-CR, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

A police officer saw a car parked in a lot linked by “numerous [pieces of] intelligence” to illegal drug activity. It was 9:25 p.m. The officer watched it for about five minutes, but did not see anyone exit the vehicle or any activity outside the vehicle, though they did observe the interior lights in the car turn on and off “a couple [of] times.” (¶3).

State v. Lamont C., 2013AP1687, District 1, 2/11/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

¶14      We conclude under the facts in this case that [Officer] Hoffman did have reasonable suspicion … to stop … Lamont C. Hoffman, relying on information provided to him by a robbery victim, located Lamont C. within minutes of the robbery. In the limited time Hoffman was able to speak with the victim,

State v. Javier Teniente, 2013AP799-CR, District 4, 1/30/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Teniente was on his boat in the chamber of Madison’s Tenney Locks waiting for the water to rise. Piqued by Teniente’s boisterous behavior, an officer standing on the wall of the lock engaged Teniente in conversation. (¶¶3-4, 15). This interaction wasn’t a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes;

State v. Chad Allen Nelson, 2013Ap1926-CR, District 3, 1/22/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Scene: The parking lot of Frosty’s Outpost, on County Road H in rural Bayfield County, 2:00 a.m. Police get a dispatch: Someone’s damaging a patron’s vehicle in the parking lot. Before an officer can respond dispatch sends an update: The suspects are bear hunters, and they left in a blue Dodge pickup with a hound box heading toward the bear camp west of Ino on Highway 2.

State v. Derek S. Strasen, 2013AP1523-CR, District 2, 1/22/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was no probable cause to administer an initial PBT to Strasen, who was stopped for speeding, even though he emitted a faint smell of intoxicants, had bloodshot and “glossy” eyes, and said he had been drinking but had his consumed his last drink over 12 hours earlier. (¶¶2, 4).

Village of Hales Corners v. David E. Adams, 2013AP1128, 1/14/13, District 2  (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Welcome to another court of appeals decision holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop a person for drunk driving.  In this particular case, an informant tipped off a police dispatcher, who then informed an officer in the vicinity about a possible drunk driver.  Armed with a vehicle description and a license plate number,

State v. Mary J. Kamuchey, 2013 AP1684-CR, District 4, 12/19/13 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

Issue:  Whether an anonymous “citizen informant’s”  call from a McDonald’s drive-through at 2:00 a.m., describing an argumentative driver who smelled of alcohol and was believed to be drunk, provided reasonable suspicion for OWI stop even though the officer who made the stop did not observe signs of erratic driving or intoxication?

Sun Prairie v. Brent D. Curry, 2013AP1206, District 4, 11/7/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had reasonable suspicion to stop Curry, who was driving on a residential street at 3:40 a.m., turned around, sped past the officer’s car, and then turned at a high rate of speed into the driveway of a residence. He then sat in the car for a few minutes before getting out and walking up the driveway;

State v. Sandra Biancardi, 2013AP1351, District 2, 10/30/13 (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Biancardi was convicted of OWI.  On appeal she argued that police unlawfully stopped her based on an uncorroborated, anonymous tip contrary to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).  The court of appeals, citing State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶24, 301 Wis. 2d 1,

State v. Roland Derliel Graham, 2013AP440-CR, District 1, 12/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Reasonable suspicion for seizing defendant

¶15      We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances described by [Officer] Wiesmueller, there was reasonable suspicion to stop Graham. Graham was stopped on property that had been the subject of DEA and police surveillance for suspected drug activity. Earlier on the day of Graham’s arrest,