On Point: 1. Stops, in general

State v. Derek S. Strasen, 2013AP1523-CR, District 2, 1/22/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was no probable cause to administer an initial PBT to Strasen, who was stopped for speeding, even though he emitted a faint smell of intoxicants, had bloodshot and “glossy” eyes, and said he had been drinking but had his consumed his last drink over 12 hours earlier. (¶¶2, 4).

Village of Hales Corners v. David E. Adams, 2013AP1128, 1/14/13, District 2  (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Welcome to another court of appeals decision holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop a person for drunk driving.  In this particular case, an informant tipped off a police dispatcher, who then informed an officer in the vicinity about a possible drunk driver.  Armed with a vehicle description and a license plate number,

State v. Mary J. Kamuchey, 2013 AP1684-CR, District 4, 12/19/13 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

Issue:  Whether an anonymous “citizen informant’s”  call from a McDonald’s drive-through at 2:00 a.m., describing an argumentative driver who smelled of alcohol and was believed to be drunk, provided reasonable suspicion for OWI stop even though the officer who made the stop did not observe signs of erratic driving or intoxication?

Sun Prairie v. Brent D. Curry, 2013AP1206, District 4, 11/7/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had reasonable suspicion to stop Curry, who was driving on a residential street at 3:40 a.m., turned around, sped past the officer’s car, and then turned at a high rate of speed into the driveway of a residence. He then sat in the car for a few minutes before getting out and walking up the driveway;

State v. Sandra Biancardi, 2013AP1351, District 2, 10/30/13 (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Biancardi was convicted of OWI.  On appeal she argued that police unlawfully stopped her based on an uncorroborated, anonymous tip contrary to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).  The court of appeals, citing State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶24, 301 Wis. 2d 1,

State v. Roland Derliel Graham, 2013AP440-CR, District 1, 12/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Reasonable suspicion for seizing defendant

¶15      We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances described by [Officer] Wiesmueller, there was reasonable suspicion to stop Graham. Graham was stopped on property that had been the subject of DEA and police surveillance for suspected drug activity. Earlier on the day of Graham’s arrest,

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue  (composed by the State’s petition for review)

In determining the legality of a vehicle stop under the Fourth Amendment, did the court of appeals properly conclude that a tail lamp that is sixty-six percent functional is in “good working order” as required under Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) and thus cannot serve as a basis for an officer’s probable cause to stop the vehicle?

Review of unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Was Vogt seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when a police officer pulled up behind Vogt’s parked car, approached the car, rapped on the driver’s window, and directed Vogt to roll the window down?

Petitions for review aren’t available on the court’s website, so the issue statement is based on the brief filed in,

Question presented:

Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle?

Lower court opinion: People v. Lorenzo Prado Navarette, et al., No. A132353, 2012 WL 4842651 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2013) (unpublished)

Docket

Scotusblog page

This is a very significant Fourth Amendment case that could change the law in Wisconsin by limiting State v.

State v. Kenneth B. Burmeister, 2013AP1016-CR, District 3, 9/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police lawfully extended a traffic stop to conduct field sobriety tests because the odor of alcohol, the driver’s initial “deflective answer”  to the question of whether he had been drinking, and his subsequent admission to drinking gave the police reasonable suspicion to believe the driver was impaired:

¶11      We reject Burmeister’s assertion that the facts observed by Logan suggest only the presence of alcohol.