On Point: 1. Stops, in general

State v. William R. Hartman, 2011AP622, District 4, 9/20/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

OWI – Refusal Hearing – Raising Challenge to Lawfulness of Stop

Refusal hearing supports litigation of lawfulness of stop; State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶42, 341 Wis. 2d 576, 815 N.W.2d 675, followed:

 ¶14      Accordingly, we reject the State’s contention that Hartman improperly raised the issue of reasonable suspicion at the refusal hearing.   

Village of Menomonee Falls v. Timothy E. Rotruck, 2012AP1024-FT, District 2, 9/1, District 2, 9/19/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Concededly proper traffic stop; after citations issued, officer sought and obtained consent to search vehicle, resulting in seizure of contraband – court concludes that, under the circumstances, traffic stop had clearly ended thus consent wasn’t product of an unnecessarily prolonged (therefore illegal) detention.

State v. Carl Rissley, 2012 WI App 112 (recommended for publication); case activity 

Reasonable suspicion supported Terry stop to investigate possible crime. Homeowner called police to report early-morning confrontation with possible trespasser, who then took flight in van at high rate of speed, and officer stopped vehicle matching description within five minutes of report:

¶13      All of this occurred just before 3:00 a.m.  When a citizen is confronted in his driveway by an unknown stranger at this time in the morning,

State v. Paul J. Mayek, 2012AP398-CR, District 3, 8/21/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶8        Although we have concluded Rasmussen did not seize Mayek until after he approached Mayek’s vehicle, it is impossible to tell from Rasmussen’s testimony precisely when the seizure occurred.  Neither the parties, nor the circuit court, appear to have given serious consideration to the issue.  Rasmussen was not questioned about what took place after he approached Mayek’s vehicle.  

State v. Johnnie Austin, 2011AP2953-CR, District 1, 8/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Continued detention of Austin, following an indisputably proper stop for illegal parking, was supported by reasonable suspicion:

¶14      This court disagrees; the trial court properly found Officer Tisher’s continued detention of Austin reasonable.  If, during a valid traffic stop, an officer becomes reasonably suspicious of an individual,

State v. Craig R. Moss, 2012AP259-CR, District 3, 8/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Terry stop of Moss’s car supported by reasonable suspicion of involvement in drug activity:

¶10      While patrolling a high crime area in the middle of the night, Steffens observed a vehicle stop briefly in front of a known drug house.  When the vehicle observed Steffens’ squad car,

Dane County v. Amy Jolene Judd, 2011AP2106, District 4, 7/19/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported temporary stop, State v. Meye, 2010AP336-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App July 14, 2010) (“odor of intoxicants alone is insufficient to raise reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop”), distinguished:

¶7        I disagree that Meye is analogous to the present case.  

State v. Diane C. Parker, 2012AP245-CR, District 4, 7/12/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

 ¶13      Applying these standards to the facts here, this court agrees with the circuit court that the deputy reasonably suspected Parker of criminal activity.  In particular, this court focuses on the following facts as supporting reasonable suspicion:  Parker’s vehicle pulled into a closed tire repair shop in the middle of the night;

State v. Joseph C. Miller, 2012 WI 61, affirming summary order; case activity

¶5   We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances police acted reasonably when they conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle that Miller was driving based on reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot.”[5]  We are confident that police had the requisite reasonable suspicion primarily based on the reliability of the final informant and the information provided by him.  

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Thomas: John M. Carroll; case activity

Traffic Stop – Duration 

¶8        Thomas argues Schellinger lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop because the only fact supporting Schellinger’s belief that Thomas was operating while intoxicated was the odor of intoxicants.  Thomas asserts the odor of intoxicants does not, by itself, constitute reasonable suspicion that a driver is operating while intoxicated.