On Point: 6. Test for seizure

State v. Tyler Q. Hayes,  2015AP314-CR, and State v. Tanner J. Crisp, 2015AP315-CR, 4/6/2016, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A sheriff’s deputy, noticing a car parked outside the lines in a parking lot, pulled behind the car, walked up to the driver’s door, and perhaps (the testimony is not clear) asked that the window be rolled down. However the window came to be open, the deputy smelled marijuana and you know the rest. So were the vehicle’s occupants seized when the deputy asked them to roll down the window and they complied?

United States v. Dontray A. Smith, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2982, 7/20/15

Smith’s encounter with two officers on bicycles amounted to a seizure based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, and because he was seized without reasonable suspicion, his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

State v. Robert C. Blankenheim, 2015AP239-CR, District 2, 7/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Blankenheim’s challenges his OAR conviction by arguing that he was unlawfully stopped, that the evidence wasn’t sufficient to prove operation on a highway, and that the police officer wasn’t a credible witness. The court of appeals disagrees “on all points….” (¶1).

State v. Juan Francisco Rosas Vivar, 2014AP2199-CR, District 4, 5/14/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vivar wasn’t seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when an officer “called out” to Vivar in as he walked across a parking lot, saying “Juan, can you come talk to me?”

State v. Richard S. Foley, 2014AP2601-CR, District 4, 4/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Detaining Foley in a squad car during a traffic stop was reasonable under the circumstances and didn’t transform the stop into an arrest.

State v. Joseph S. Cali, 2014AP493-CR, District 2, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying the recent decision in County of Grant v. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, 356 Wis. 2d 343, 850 N.W.2d 253, the court of appeals holds that Cali wasn’t seized when a police officer, thinking Cali might be lost, pulled his squad car near Cali without activating his lights, got out and approached Cali, and from “normal talking distance” asked Cali “what was going on, if I could help him with anything.” (¶¶2-3).

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by Hogan’s petition for review):

1. When a person is illegally detained by law enforcement for a period of time and then is verbally released by the officers for a comparatively very brief period of time before being re-approached by the officer(s), when is the time of the officers’ disengagement of the person properly regarded as a brief interruption of the illegal detention and when should the disengagement be regarded as the end of one stop and the start of a second stop?

State v. Micah J. Snyder, 2013AP299-CR, 10/2/14, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Based on County of Grant v. Vogt, decided just 2 months ago, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s decision to grant Snyder’s suppression motion in this OWI case. The court of appeals held that Snyder was not “seized” when a trooper parked his squad car face-to-face with Snyder’s car, approached Snyder on foot while carrying a flashlight, and then questioned him through a car window.

County of Grant v. Daniel A. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, 7/18/14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

“Although we acknowledge that this is a close case, we conclude that a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave.” (¶3).

State v. Patrick E. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44; case activity

The circuit court’s findings—Gordon was in a high-crime area; he and his friends “recognized the police presence”; and, as a result, Gordon engaged in a “security adjustment,” which is “a conscious or unconscious movement that an individual does when they’re confronted by law enforcement when they’re typically carrying a weapon” and involves placing a hand over the place the gun is to make sure it’s still there (¶¶3-7,