On Point: b. Stop found unlawful

State v. Joshua Allan Vitek, 2015AP421-CR, District 3, 10/27/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under State v. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, 306 Wis. 2d 193, 742 N.W.2d 923, police may reasonably assume the driver of a car is likely to be the owner, and may stop the car if they know the owner’s operating privileges are invalid. But what if more than one person owns the car, but only one of the owners has an invalid license? The state claims that a traffic stop is still justified by the fact that one of the owners has an invalid license. The court of appeals disagrees, at least when—as in this case—the state presents no evidence as to the number of registered owners and the validity of their operating privileges.

United States v. Rodolpho Hernandez Flores, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1515, 8/19/15 (per curiam)

Hernandez Flores was stopped for driving with an obstructed license plate because his rear plate was affixed to his car by a standard frame that covered the plate’s periphery. The stop violated the Fourth Amendment because it was based on an unreasonable mistake of law regarding the statute governing the display of license plates.

State v. Kim M. Lerdahl, 2014AP2119-CR, District 3, 8/4/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In an interesting decision that sheds some light on how to apply the newly-adopted “reasonable mistake of law” doctrine to traffic stops, State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,  the court of appeals holds that it a police officer’s mistaken belief that the truck she stopped was required to have a center high-mount stop (or brake) lamp (CHMSL) was not a reasonable mistake of law and, therefore, the stop was unlawful.

Town of Bloomfield v. Petko Zvetkov Barashki, 2015AP226, District 2, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a case the court of appeals aptly describes as “unusual,” the court exercises its discretionary power of reversal under § 752.35 to throw out Barashki’s OWI 1st conviction and refusal finding on the grounds that the evidence doesn’t show the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Barashki.

Village of Chenequa v. Chad C. Schmalz, 2015AP94-FT, District 2, 4/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The stop of Schmalz’s car was not supported by reasonable suspicion or justified by the community caretaker doctrine.

State v. Cody J. Nolan, 2014AP1359-CR, District 3/4, 12/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The police did not have reasonable suspicion to believe the red car Nolan was driving had been involved in a reportable accident and was leaving the scene or was assisting others in leaving the scene of a reportable accident in violation of § 346.70(1) or (1m)(b), as there was no evidence supporting a reasonable belief the alleged accident involved sufficient property damage to make it reportable under the statute.

State v. Daniel S. Iverson, 2014AP515-FT, 10/9/14, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 1/16/15; reversed, 2015 WI 101; case activity

Iverson won a motion to suppress and dismissal of his first OWI.  He prevailed again on appeal.  Turns out the state trooper did not stop Iverson on suspicion of OWI.  He initiated the stop because he observed a cigarette butt being tossed from the passenger side of Iverson’s Jeep, which is neither a crime nor a traffic violation.  Thus, traffic stops based on non-traffic forfeiture offenses are illegal.

State v. Benjamin P. Lind, 2014AP749-CR, District 3, 9/30/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Officer’s observation of an unfamiliar vehicle entering the driveway of a home of a local police officer at 1:36 a.m. did not provide reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle.

State v. Antonio D. Brown, 2014 WI 69, 7/16/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity

Another defense victory!  Police stopped  Brown’s car due to an alleged violation of §347.13(1), which prohibits the operation of a vehicle at night unless its tail lamps are in “good working order.”  In a 4-3 decision, the majority holds that the police here misunderstood the statute, so the stop was illegal.  Furthermore, a stop based upon an officer’s mistake of law, is unlawful, and the results of the ensuing search must be suppressed. Justice Prosser, dissenting, predicts the majority’s interpretation will be “a bonanza for litigants seeking to challenge motor vehicle stops.” ¶79.

State v. Gumersinda M. Gonzalez, 2013AP2585-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of a traffic stop by asking a driver to perform field sobriety tests, so evidence of THC possession obtained during the stop must be suppressed.