On Point: 2. Traffic stops

State v. Mark Alan Tralmer, 2015AP715-CR, District 4, 10/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court’s implicit rejection of Tralmer’s suppression hearing testimony and acceptance of the police officer’s contrary testimony were not clearly erroneous and therefore must be upheld on appeal, State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748. Accordingly, the circuit court properly concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Tralmer for violating § 346.05(1) by swerving into the wrong lane of traffic when there is no obstruction requiring the driver to do so, as allowed under § 346.05(1)(d).

County of Shawano v. Kory V. Amborziak, 2015AP462, 9/22/15, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

Ambroziak didn’t challenge an officer’s decision to stop his car for disorderly conduct. Instead, he contended that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to conduct field sobriety tests but he lost based on the facts found by the circuit court:

State v. Manuel Talavera, 2015AP701-CR, District 2, 9/9/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

To  justify a warrantless traffic stop based on a violation of § 346.34(1)(b), the officer doesn’t need evidence that a driver’s failure to signal before turning his vehicle actually affected other traffic because the statute simply requires motorists to signal turns whenever “other traffic may be affected by the movement.” Thus, evidence that Talavera failed to signal when there was a (police) vehicle following two car lengths behind him was sufficient to justify stopping him.

United States v. Rodolpho Hernandez Flores, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1515, 8/19/15 (per curiam)

Hernandez Flores was stopped for driving with an obstructed license plate because his rear plate was affixed to his car by a standard frame that covered the plate’s periphery. The stop violated the Fourth Amendment because it was based on an unreasonable mistake of law regarding the statute governing the display of license plates.

Columbia County v. Jessica N. Johnson, 2015AP332, District 4, 8/27/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to extend Johnson’s detention and ask her to do field sobriety tests based on additional information he gleaned after the initial contact with Johnson. State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 93-95, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999), applied.

Village of Fredonia v. Bruce A. Gossett, 2015AP298, District 2, 8/12/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police need probable cause to believe the driver is operating while intoxicated before they can request a PBT from the driver of a noncommercial vehicle; but for a commercial driver, they can request a PBT if they detect “any presence” of alcohol or have “reason to believe” the driver is operating with an alcohol concentration above zero, § 343.303, and State v. Goss, 2011 WI 104, ¶12, 338 Wis. 2d 72, 806 N.W.2d 918. The “reason to believe” standard was satisfied in this case, so police properly asked Gossett—the driver of a semi tractor-trailer—for a PBT.

State v. Kim M. Lerdahl, 2014AP2119-CR, District 3, 8/4/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In an interesting decision that sheds some light on how to apply the newly-adopted “reasonable mistake of law” doctrine to traffic stops, State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,  the court of appeals holds that it a police officer’s mistaken belief that the truck she stopped was required to have a center high-mount stop (or brake) lamp (CHMSL) was not a reasonable mistake of law and, therefore, the stop was unlawful.

State v. Tammy R. Fullmer, 2015AP640-CR, District 4, 7/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Trial counsel was deficient for failing to effectively impeach the officer’s testimony that Fullmer failed to stop in front of a stop line because the intersection in question didn’t have a stop line; however, there were multiple other observations the officer made that justified the traffic stop even in the absence of the stop line violation (e.g., extremely slow driving, driving down the middle of a two lane road, weaving in her lane), so Fullmer wasn’t prejudiced. (¶¶4-7, 11, 14).

State v. Patrick Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 7/10/2015, affirming a court of appeals per curiam decision, 2013AP430-CR, majority opinion by Prosser; concurrence by Ziegler, dissent by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

Sixteen seconds. It takes longer than that just to find your keys, get into your car, buckle up and start your engine. Keep that in mind as you read on. SCOW found that a traffic stop (due to a seatbelt violation) was unconstitutionally extended to perform field sobriety tests, but then upheld the subsequent vehicle search based on consent given 16 seconds after law enforcement told Hogan he was “free to leave.” SCOW saw no need to perform an attenuation analysis.

State v. Robert C. Blankenheim, 2015AP239-CR, District 2, 7/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Blankenheim’s challenges his OAR conviction by arguing that he was unlawfully stopped, that the evidence wasn’t sufficient to prove operation on a highway, and that the police officer wasn’t a credible witness. The court of appeals disagrees “on all points….” (¶1).