On Point: 2. Traffic stops

State v. Gumersinda M. Gonzalez, 2013AP2585-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of a traffic stop by asking a driver to perform field sobriety tests, so evidence of THC possession obtained during the stop must be suppressed.

State v. Dean M. Blatterman, 2013AP2107-CR, District 4, 4/24/14 (one-judge; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 46; case activity

You don’t see this very often.  The court of appeals just reversed a circuit court decision denying a motion to suppress evidence of intoxication.  The police performed field sobriety and blood tests after moving the suspect out of the general vicinity of the stop.  This converted the stop into an arrest for which there was no probable cause.

Navarette v. California, USSC No. 12-9490, 4/22/14, affirming People v. Navarette, No. A132343, 2012 WL 4842651 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2013) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (includes links to the briefs and commentary)

Validating the rationale employed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516, the U.S. Supreme Court upholds the stop of a vehicle based on a 911 caller’s report that the vehicle ran her off the road, even though the police officer who located and then followed the vehicle observed no improper or erratic driving.

State v. Matthew M. Moskopf, 2013AP771-CR, District 2, 4/2/14; court of appeals decision (one judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The police had collective knowledge of specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion to stop Moskopf’s vehicle where two 911 calls to the police department dispatcher–one from a bartender, another from an off-duty cop–reported that a man had been trying to get back into a bar he had been kicked out of,

State v. Jesse A. Van Camp, 2013AP2059-CR, District 3, 3/25/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Although an “[a]dmittedly … close case” (¶15), police had reasonable suspicion to stop Van Camp under all the circumstances, including his “somewhat evasive” driving behavior, even though they observed no specific criminal activity, applying State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84,

State v. Mitchell M. Treiber, 2013AP2684-CR, District 3, 3/11/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The inevitable discovery doctrine, which provides that “evidence obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means,” State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 427, 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct.

State v. Michael J. Adrian, Jr., 2013AP1890-CR, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Transporting Adrian from the site his vehicle was stopped to the nearest police station for the purpose of performing field sobriety tests did not convert a lawful Terry detention into an illegal custodial arrest.

A person temporarily detained under Terry may be moved “in the general vicinity of the stop without converting what would otherwise be a temporary seizure into an arrest.” State v.

Marquette County v. Randy S. Tomaw, 2013AP1510, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Tomaw was going 17 miles over the speed limit at 1:20 on a Sunday morning. He did not appear to respond to the officer’s initial attempt at contact, his upper body swayed as he walked to the rear of his vehicle, and the officer detected the “strong odor” of alcohol on his breath.

Village of Little Chute v. Ronald A. Rosin, 2013AP2536, District 3, 2/25/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rosin argues that field sobriety tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment because “[a]n inherent right as a human being is to control and coordinate the actions of [his or her] own body[,]” and, therefore “a fundamental expectation of privacy is implicated when a person is subject to the performance of [field sobriety tests].” (¶12).

State v. Lawrence A. Levasseur, Jr., 2013AP2369-CR, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The arresting officer used an implied consent form that pre-dated the 2009 amendments to § 343.305, so it omitted language about accidents involving death or serious injury–language that did not apply to Levasseur’s situation. The use of the outdated form didn’t strip the resulting blood test result of its statutory presumption of admissibility and accuracy,