On Point: 2. Traffic stops

State v. Matthew M. Moskopf, 2013AP771-CR, District 2, 4/2/14; court of appeals decision (one judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The police had collective knowledge of specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion to stop Moskopf’s vehicle where two 911 calls to the police department dispatcher–one from a bartender, another from an off-duty cop–reported that a man had been trying to get back into a bar he had been kicked out of,

State v. Jesse A. Van Camp, 2013AP2059-CR, District 3, 3/25/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Although an “[a]dmittedly … close case” (¶15), police had reasonable suspicion to stop Van Camp under all the circumstances, including his “somewhat evasive” driving behavior, even though they observed no specific criminal activity, applying State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84,

State v. Mitchell M. Treiber, 2013AP2684-CR, District 3, 3/11/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The inevitable discovery doctrine, which provides that “evidence obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means,” State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 427, 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct.

State v. Michael J. Adrian, Jr., 2013AP1890-CR, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Transporting Adrian from the site his vehicle was stopped to the nearest police station for the purpose of performing field sobriety tests did not convert a lawful Terry detention into an illegal custodial arrest.

A person temporarily detained under Terry may be moved “in the general vicinity of the stop without converting what would otherwise be a temporary seizure into an arrest.” State v.

Marquette County v. Randy S. Tomaw, 2013AP1510, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Tomaw was going 17 miles over the speed limit at 1:20 on a Sunday morning. He did not appear to respond to the officer’s initial attempt at contact, his upper body swayed as he walked to the rear of his vehicle, and the officer detected the “strong odor” of alcohol on his breath.

Village of Little Chute v. Ronald A. Rosin, 2013AP2536, District 3, 2/25/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rosin argues that field sobriety tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment because “[a]n inherent right as a human being is to control and coordinate the actions of [his or her] own body[,]” and, therefore “a fundamental expectation of privacy is implicated when a person is subject to the performance of [field sobriety tests].” (¶12).

State v. Lawrence A. Levasseur, Jr., 2013AP2369-CR, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The arresting officer used an implied consent form that pre-dated the 2009 amendments to § 343.305, so it omitted language about accidents involving death or serious injury–language that did not apply to Levasseur’s situation. The use of the outdated form didn’t strip the resulting blood test result of its statutory presumption of admissibility and accuracy,

State v. Derek S. Strasen, 2013AP1523-CR, District 2, 1/22/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was no probable cause to administer an initial PBT to Strasen, who was stopped for speeding, even though he emitted a faint smell of intoxicants, had bloodshot and “glossy” eyes, and said he had been drinking but had his consumed his last drink over 12 hours earlier. (¶¶2, 4).

Village of Hales Corners v. David E. Adams, 2013AP1128, 1/14/13, District 2  (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Welcome to another court of appeals decision holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop a person for drunk driving.  In this particular case, an informant tipped off a police dispatcher, who then informed an officer in the vicinity about a possible drunk driver.  Armed with a vehicle description and a license plate number,

State v. David Lawrence Eastman, 2013AP1401-CR, District 3 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A police officer may conduct a traffic stop when he has grounds to reasonably suspect that either a crime or a traffic violation has or will be committed.   See State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶23, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569; State v.