On Point: 2. Traffic stops

State v. Derek S. Strasen, 2013AP1523-CR, District 2, 1/22/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was no probable cause to administer an initial PBT to Strasen, who was stopped for speeding, even though he emitted a faint smell of intoxicants, had bloodshot and “glossy” eyes, and said he had been drinking but had his consumed his last drink over 12 hours earlier. (¶¶2, 4).

Village of Hales Corners v. David E. Adams, 2013AP1128, 1/14/13, District 2  (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Welcome to another court of appeals decision holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop a person for drunk driving.  In this particular case, an informant tipped off a police dispatcher, who then informed an officer in the vicinity about a possible drunk driver.  Armed with a vehicle description and a license plate number,

State v. David Lawrence Eastman, 2013AP1401-CR, District 3 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A police officer may conduct a traffic stop when he has grounds to reasonably suspect that either a crime or a traffic violation has or will be committed.   See State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶23, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569; State v.

State v. Daniel R. Folkman, 2013AP1363-CR, District 3, 12/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A deputy on patrol checked the license plate of an oncoming car. The check showed the car belonged to Folkman. The deputy then checked Folkman’s license status, which was expired, so the deputy stopped the car, ultimately resulting in Folkman’s arrest for OWI. (¶2). The court of appeals rejects Folkman’s claim the deputy needed some valid reason to initiate the registration and license checks.

State v. Steven L. Udelhofen, 2013AP1244-CR, District 4, 11/14/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s findings of fact regarding the circumstances of the stop of Udelhofen are not clearly erroneous despite the fact that he squad car video didn’t corroborate all the details of the officer’s testimony regarding his observations, applying State v. Walli, 2011 WI App 86,

Sun Prairie v. Brent D. Curry, 2013AP1206, District 4, 11/7/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had reasonable suspicion to stop Curry, who was driving on a residential street at 3:40 a.m., turned around, sped past the officer’s car, and then turned at a high rate of speed into the driveway of a residence. He then sat in the car for a few minutes before getting out and walking up the driveway;

State v. Nick A. Lutter, 2012AP2586, District 4, 10/31/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s findings of fact at the suppression hearing were not clearly erroneous, and they supported the court’s conclusion there was reasonable suspicion to stop Lutter. Among other reasons for the stop, the state trooper cited Lutter’s crossing the fog line twice and driving onto the fog line once.

State v. Sandra Biancardi, 2013AP1351, District 2, 10/30/13 (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Biancardi was convicted of OWI.  On appeal she argued that police unlawfully stopped her based on an uncorroborated, anonymous tip contrary to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).  The court of appeals, citing State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶24, 301 Wis. 2d 1,

Jackson County v. Robert J. Troka, 2013AP317, District 4, 10/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A police officer lawfully stopped a car traveling in the opposite direction that flashed its high beams at the officer twice, once within about a half mile of the officer, the second time within about 200 feet of the officer, even though the officer’s high beams were not on.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue  (composed by the State’s petition for review)

In determining the legality of a vehicle stop under the Fourth Amendment, did the court of appeals properly conclude that a tail lamp that is sixty-six percent functional is in “good working order” as required under Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) and thus cannot serve as a basis for an officer’s probable cause to stop the vehicle?