On Point blog, page 29 of 36
Traffic Stop – Probable Cause – Crossing Fog Line
Kenosha County v. Jodi A. Braune, 2010AP834, District 2, 3/9/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Braune: Theodore B. Kmiec, III; case activity
¶7 We hold that under the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 346.13(3), Braune’s deviation over the fog line was sufficient to establish probable cause that Braune committed a traffic violation. When the deputy observed Braune’s conduct, he had probable cause that Braune did not drive “in the lane designated.” See § 346.13(3).
Traffic Stop
County of Sheboygan v. William M. Lane, 2010AP1756, District 2, 2/2/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Lane: George Limbeck; case activity; State BiC; Lane Resp.
¶6 As a threshold matter, the County addresses the proper test for assessing the validity of the traffic stop. The County contends that the appropriate standard is “reasonable suspicion” as opposed to “probable cause.” We disagree.
Reasonable Suspicion – Traffic Stop – Informant’s Tip
State v. Joshua J. Hysell, 2010AP1817-CR, District 4, 1/27/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Hysell: John Smerlinski; case activity; Hysell BiC; State Resp.
Phoned tip by driver who gave his name and described the subject vehicle as “all over the road” held sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion for stop.
Because the informant gave his name,
State v. Deandre A. Buchanan, No. 2009AP2934-CR, review granted 1/11/11
decision below: unpublished; for Buchanan: Tyler William Wickman; case activity
Issue (formulated by On Point):
Whether, during the course of a routine traffic stop, the police developed reasonable suspicion to believe Buchanan armed and dangerous so as to perform a “protective search” of his car.
The court relied on the following to show reasonable suspicion to believe Buchanan armed and dangerous, during an otherwise routine stop for speeding:
- “furtive movements”
Traffic Stop – Speeding
State v. Thomas R. Paulick, 2010AP1883, District 2, 1/12/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Paulick: Robert C. Raymond; case activity; Paulick BiC; State Resp.; Reply
The officer’s conclusion of speeding may be based on a visual estimate “while looking in his rear view mirror,” ¶8, citing City of Milwaukee v.
Maintaining Drug Trafficking Place, / Possession with Intent to Deliver, PTAC- Insufficient Proof
State v. John M. Eaton, 2010AP1170-CR, District 4, 12/23/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Eaton: Chad A. Lanning; case activity; Eaton BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Traffic stop upheld where: “vehicle weave(d) in a pronounced manner within tis own lane of traffic”; vehicle came to complete stop at yellow blinking light (something officer testified was “possible indicia of impaired driving”;
Traffic Stop – Illumination Requirement
State v. George C. Greenwood, 2010AP1837-CR, District 4, 12/16/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Greenwood: Gerald C. Opgenorth; case activity; Greenwood BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Traffic stop properly based on violation of illuminaiton requirement in § 347.13(3) (rear plate must be illuminated by white light so as to be clearly legible from distance of 50 feet).
Traffic Stop – Reasonable Suspicion
State v. Brian R. Rogers, 2010AP1300-CR, District 4, 12/9/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; State’s Resp. Br.
Even assuming Rogers violated no traffic law, his driving pattern provided reasonable suspicion for a stop:
¶10 Here too, the totality of the circumstances provided Lambrecht with reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Lambrecht observed Rogers’ vehicle weave both within and outside its lane multiple times over the span of approximately one mile.
Reasonable Suspicion for PBT
County of Sauk v. Julio Leon, 2010AP1593, District 4, 11/24/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Leon: Robert C. Raymond; Leon BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Odor of intoxicants insufficient, alone, to support administering PBT.
¶20 When an officer is not aware of bad driving, then other factors suggesting impairment must be more substantial. For example,
Traffic Stop – Duration; Field Sobriety Testing – PBT
State v. Joshua L. McDonald, 2010AP1045-CR, District 4, 11/18/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for McDonald: Tracey A. Wood; McDonald BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Traffic Stop – Duration
¶13 We conclude that the time it took for the deputy to ask McDonald whether he had been drinking that night and for McDonald to answer did not unreasonably prolong the stop.