On Point: 2. Traffic stops

State v. John M. Eaton, 2010AP1170-CR, District 4, 12/23/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Eaton: Chad A. Lanning; case activity; Eaton BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Traffic stop upheld where: “vehicle weave(d) in a pronounced manner within tis own lane of traffic”; vehicle came to complete stop at yellow blinking light (something officer testified was “possible indicia of impaired driving”;

State v. George C. Greenwood, 2010AP1837-CR, District 4, 12/16/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Greenwood: Gerald C. Opgenorth; case activity; Greenwood BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Traffic stop properly based on violation of illuminaiton requirement in § 347.13(3) (rear plate must be illuminated by white light so as to be clearly legible from distance of 50 feet).

State v. Brian R. Rogers, 2010AP1300-CR, District 4, 12/9/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; State’s Resp. Br.

Even assuming Rogers violated no traffic law, his driving pattern provided reasonable suspicion for a stop:

¶10      Here too, the totality of the circumstances provided Lambrecht with reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.  Lambrecht observed Rogers’ vehicle weave both within and outside its lane multiple times over the span of approximately one mile.  

County of Sauk v. Julio Leon, 2010AP1593, District 4, 11/24/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Leon: Robert C. Raymond; Leon BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Odor of intoxicants insufficient, alone, to support administering PBT.

¶20      When an officer is not aware of bad driving, then other factors suggesting impairment must be more substantial.  For example,

State v. Joshua L. McDonald, 2010AP1045-CR, District 4, 11/18/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for McDonald: Tracey A. Wood; McDonald BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Traffic Stop – Duration

¶13      We conclude that the time it took for the deputy to ask McDonald whether he had been drinking that night and for McDonald to answer did not unreasonably prolong the stop.  

State v. John J. Neff, 2010AP1092-CR, District 2, 11/10/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Neff: Dennis P. Coffey; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Report that intoxicated individual had urinated in public and was driving away held  sufficiently reliable to support stop:

¶12      We now turn to the anonymous tip in this case.  The tip was that two individuals were possibly intoxicated in the Sybaris parking lot,

State v. Joseph F. Brown, 2010AP832-CR, District 4, 10/14/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Brown: Adam Walsh; BiC; Resp.

It violates § 347.12(1)(a) to flash high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle if the latter’s high-beams are not themselves lit. Because Brown flashed his high-beams within 500 feet of an officer’s oncoming vehicle and, according to the trial court’s findings,

court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); for Batt: Chad A. Lanning; BiC; Resp.; Reply

OWI – Implied Consent Law – § 343.305(5)(a) Testing

Construing State v. Stary, 187 Wis. 2d 266, 522 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1994), the court concludes that the Implied Consent law affords the driver the right to choose testing administered by the law enforcement agency at no expense to the driver,

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Grenie: John C. Orth; Steven J. House; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Traffic Stop – Blue Lights

Traffic stop for having blue lights lit on front of vehicle, upheld. (§ 347.07(2)(a) bars display of “(a)ny color of light other than white or amber visible from directly in front.”)

¶6        Grenie essentially asks this court to credit testimony by his two witnesses suggesting that the blue lights were “never” operational over the officer’s testimony that he saw the lights lit when Grenie’s Jeep passed him.

State v. Joseph Donald Peacock, 2010AP954-CR, District 3, 9/21/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Peacock: James R. Phelan; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Because the officer knew from previous contacts, including one a mere 6 days prior, that Peacock’s driver’s license was suspended, he had reasonable suspicion to stop Peacock’s vehicle even though there were multiple occupants and the officer couldn’t see the driver.