On Point blog, page 2 of 3
“Boilerplate” motion to suppress did not contain sufficient allegations to merit an evidentiary hearing
State v. Dylan D. Radder, 2018 WI App 36; case activity (including briefs)
In a decision every trial-level criminal defense lawyer must read, the court of appeals affirms the denial of a motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing because the motion failed to allege sufficient facts to raise a question of disputed fact that must be resolved at a hearing. Understand the standards set out in this decision, make sure your motions attempt to adhere to them, and be prepared to argue your suppression motions satisfy them, as every prosecutor and trial judge will be eager to invoke this decision to deny your motions without a hearing.
Courts may reopen suppression hearings to give State 2nd kick at meeting burden of proof
State v. Jesse U. Felbab, 2017AP12-CR, 8/2/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
If at first you don’t succeed, try, try, try again. That’s surely the State’s take away from this decision. Deputy Schoonover stopped Felbab for erratic driving and determined that field sobriety tests and a drug-detecting dog were in order, so he called for a back up. This led to the State charging Felbab with possession of THC. He moved to suppress. Before giving its decision, the court told the parties that it would be willing to grant a motion to reopen if the losing party wanted to enter more evidence into the record. Hint. Hint.
SCOW: No right to confront witnesses at suppression hearings
State v. Glenn T. Zamzow, 2017 WI 29, 4/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant whose guilt or innocence is at stake at trial may employ the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ …. But the Sixth Amendment does not mandate that statements considered at a suppression hearing face the crucible of cross-examination. Nor does the Due Process Clause demand this. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not deny Zamzow his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by relying on an audio recording of a deceased officer’s statement at the suppression hearing.” (¶31).
State v. Glenn T. Zamzow, 2014AP2603-CR, petition for review granted 3/7/16
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (composed by On Point):
Does the Confrontation Clause or Due Process Clause prohibit a circuit court from relying on hearsay evidence in deciding a suppression motion?
Confrontation Clause doesn’t apply to suppression hearings
State v. Glenn T. Zamzow, 2016 WI App 7, petition for review granted, 3/7/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 29; case activity (including briefs)
Relying on precedent predating Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), two judges of the court of appeals hold that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to suppression hearings and that the circuit court could rely on hearsay evidence in denying Zamzow’s motion to suppress. The third judge on the panel dissents, arguing the majority’s conclusion “rests upon a shaky foundation” (¶20) and “continues [the] unfortunate legacy” of pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence (¶23).
Trial court properly reopened case to take additional evidence regarding tip that led to stop of intoxicated driver
City of Bloomer v. James S. Frank, 2013AP2597, District 3, 8/5/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion in reopening suppression hearing to take additional evidence in the form of dispatch recordings which the city tried, but failed, to obtain before the suppression hearing in the case.
Police had reasonable suspicion for traffic stop despite some discrepancies between description in dispatch and car actually stopped
State v. Chad Allen Nelson, 2013Ap1926-CR, District 3, 1/22/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Scene: The parking lot of Frosty’s Outpost, on County Road H in rural Bayfield County, 2:00 a.m. Police get a dispatch: Someone’s damaging a patron’s vehicle in the parking lot. Before an officer can respond dispatch sends an update: The suspects are bear hunters, and they left in a blue Dodge pickup with a hound box heading toward the bear camp west of Ino on Highway 2.
Evidence needed to establish reliability of drug-sniffing dog for purposes of determining probable cause
Florida v. Harris, USSC No. 11-817, 2/19/13
United States Supreme Court decision, overruling Harris v. Florida, 71 So. 3d 756 (2011)
In a unanimous decision addressing the question of when a drug-sniffing dog’s alert constitutes probable cause, the Supreme Court overturned the Florida Supreme Court’s requirement that the state produce records of the dog’s reliability in the field in order to support probable cause.
State v. Dimitrius Anagnos, 2011 WI App 118, rev. granted 1/25/12
on review of published opinion; for Anagnos: Barry S. Cohen; case activity; prior post
Traffic Stop – Reasonable Suspicion – OWI Refusal Hearing Challenge to Arrest
Issues (composed by On Point):
1. Whether the officer could lawfully stop Anagnos’ vehicle for failing to use a turn signal where neither traffic nor pedestrians were present, § 346.34(1)(b).
2. Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Anagnos’
Traffic Stop: Reasonable Suspicion, Traffic Violation; OWI Refusal Hearing: Lawfulness of Arrest
State v. Dimitrius Anagnos, 2011 WI App 118 (recommended for publication); for Anagnos: Barry S. Cohen; case activity; reversed, 2012 WI 64
Traffic Stop – No Turn Signal
Failure to use a turn signal where neither traffic nor pedestrians are present doesn’t support a traffic stop:
¶9 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.34(1)(b) states that a driver must use a turn signal “[i]n the event that any other traffic may be affected.” The circuit court found that Anagnos did not violate this statute when he made a left turn without using his signal,