On Point blog, page 2 of 9

Get your COMPAS bearings!

While we’re waiting for a decision in State v. Loomis to tell us whether we can have access to the inner workings of the de facto Deus ex machina of Wisconsin sentencing proceedings, we thought you’d be interested in this investigative report on the COMPAS by the investigative reporters at ProPublica.

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SCOTUS: Unnoticed use of incorrect guideline range merits correction in most cases

Molina-Martinez v. United States, USSC No. 14-8913, 2016 WL 1574581 (April 20, 2016), reversing and remanding United States v. Molina-Martinez, 588 Fed. Appx. 333 (5th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Emphasizing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ “central” role in sentencing because they “serve as the starting point for the district court’s decision and anchor the court’s discretion in selecting an appropriate sentence” (slip op. at 9, 15), the Supreme Court holds that the application of an erroneous Guidelines range will usually be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome for the purposes of plain-error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).

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Seventh Circuit: Peugh v. U.S. isn’t retroactive

David Conrad v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3216, 3/4/16

Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013), held that the ex post facto clause prohibits a sentencing court from using a Sentencing Guideline in effect at the time of sentencing instead of the Guideline in effect at the time of the offense if the new version of the Guideline provides a higher applicable sentencing range than the old version. The Seventh Circuit holds Peugh shouldn’t be applied retroactively to allow resentencing in a case that was final before Peugh was decided.

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State v. Eric L. Loomis, 2015AP157-CR, certification granted 11/4/15

On review of a court of appeals certification; case activity

Issue (from certification)

Does a defendant’s right to due process prohibit a circuit court from relying on COMPAS assessments when imposing sentence, either because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents defendants from challenging the COMPAS assessment’s scientific validity, or because COMPAS assessments take gender into account.

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New research on using risk assessment at sentencing

If you are working on a COMPAS issue, you may be interested in a new research paper, “Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing,” from the University of Virginia School of Law.  Here is the abstract:

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Court of Appeals certifies issues challenging use of COMPAS assessments at sentencing

State v. Eric L. Loomis, 2015AP157-CR, District 4, 9/17/15, certification granted 11/4/15, circuit court affirmed, 2016 WI 68; case activity (including briefs)

Issues

We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide whether the right to due process prohibits circuit courts from relying on COMPAS assessments when imposing sentence. More specifically, we certify whether this practice violates a defendant’s right to due process, either because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents defendants from challenging the COMPAS assessment’s scientific validity, or because COMPAS assessments take gender into account. Given the widespread use of COMPAS assessments, we believe that prompt supreme court review of the matter is needed.

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Sentencing court didn’t misuse discretion by not following OWI sentencing guidelines

State v. Sharod D. Weaver, 2015AP170-CR, District 3, 8/31/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Though the sentencing court made comments suggesting it mistakenly believed the OWI sentencing guidelines “don’t consider the four primary sentencing factors,” these comments don’t show the sentencing court actually believed that; rather, the court of appeals concludes, the sentencing court was saying that following the guidelines was not appropriate in Weaver’s case. Thus, the sentencing court didn’t misuse its discretion.

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Gallion: “Mr. Cellophane shoulda been my name”

State v. John Eddie Farmer, Sr., 2014AP2623-CR, 6/30/15, District 1 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs

Defense lawyers encounter this problem too often. The circuit court inadequately explains the reasons for the sentence it imposed and then shores up its rationale at the postconviction stage. This decision holds that a circuit court, which failed to mention any sentencing objectives, nevertheless met Gallion’s “bare minimum requirements.” And even if it hadn’t, it wouldn’t matter because the court of appeals could search the record for reasons to affirm the sentence. Slip op. ¶14.

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Sentencing court didn’t err in its interpretation or application of COMPAS report

State v. Jordan John Samsa, 2015 WI App 6; case activity

The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in using the criminogenic needs section of the COMPAS assessment report, which identifies areas in which the offender needs correctional or community intervention, as an indicator of Samsa’s danger to the community.

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Sentencing — consideration of dismissed charge. Resisting/obstructing, § 946.41 — sufficiency of evidence.

State v. Earnest Lee Nicholson, 2013AP722-CR, District 1, 10/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Nicholson was arrested for felony battery of his girlfriend, Marnice Franklin, but the battery charge was dismissed after Franklin failed to appear to testify at trial; Nicholson was also charged with resisting an officer, and that charge proceeded to trial and a guilty verdict. (¶¶2-4). At sentencing on the resisting charge the judge made extensive remarks concerning the alleged battery,

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