On Point blog, page 4 of 7
SCOW: Sentence credit of revoked parolee must be applied to reincarceration time
State v. Andrew Obriecht, 2015 WI 66, 7/7/15, reversing a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
When sentence credit is granted after a convicted defendant’s parole is revoked, the additional credit must be applied to the parolee’s reincarceration time, and not—as the Department of Corrections and the court of appeals thought—to any period of parole remaining after the reincarceration time is served.
Judge—not clerk—makes sentence credit determination
State v. Tahj E. Kitt, 2015 WI App 9; case activity
“When a convicted offender has put sentence credit at issue, the court—not the clerk—must make and explain the decision on how much sentence credit is to be awarded.” (¶2).
State v. Andrew M. Obriecht, 2013AP1345-CR, petition for review granted 11/14/14
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
When additional sentence credit is granted after an offender’s parole has been revoked, is the additional credit applied to the offender’s term of reincarceration, or to the remaining period of parole?
Defendant allowed dual credit for presentence custody served for a burglary and an unrelated civil commitment
State v. Joseph T. Trepanier, 2014 WI App 105; case activity
This case presents an issue of first impression: Whether a defendant is entitled to sentence credit for time spent in presentence custody for a burglary when he was also in custody pursuant to an unrelated civil commitment for contempt of court. The State, naturally, opposed dual sentence credit. But the winner is . . . the defendant!
Additional pre-sentence credit granted after revocation of parole isn’t applied to reincarceration time
State v. Andrew M. Obriecht, 2014 WI App 42, petition for review granted 11/14/14, reversed, 2015 WI 66; case activity
When sentence credit for time spent in custody before the defendant was sentenced is not granted until after the defendant has been revoked from parole and reincarcerated, the plain language of § 302.11(7)(am) and (b) requires DOC to apply the credit to the remaining period of parole,
Retroactive application of the law repealing the 2009 Act 28 early release statutes violates ex post facto clauses
State ex rel. Aman Singh v. Paul Kemper, 2014 WI App 43, petitions for review and cross review granted 11/4/15, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 2016 WI 67; case activity
When Singh committed, or was convicted and sentenced for, his offenses, he was eligible for early release under statutes enacted by 2009 Wisconsin Act 28. But by the time he arrived at prison,
Terry stop — reasonable suspicion; DNA surcharge — exercise of discretion; sentence credit — time between revocation and return to prison
State v. Manuel R. Williams, 2012AP357-CR, District 1, 1/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Terry stop – reasonable suspicion
Police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant where, based on suppression hearing testimony, circuit court found that: the officers were sent to a shooting in “a high risk area”; when police arrived, they noticed Williams because he had a big jacket on and was holding his hands in an “odd” way,
Sentence Credit, § 973.155
State v. Daryl J. Teska, 2011AP1010-CR, District 2, 3/14/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Teska: John E. German; case activity
Teska was originally placed on probation, sentences withheld, on 3 counts; jail time as a condition of probation was ordered as to 1 count. Probation was later revoked and although all 3 of sentences were imposed concurrently, credit for the time spent in jail as a condition of probation was allocated only to that particular count.
Sentence Credit, Previously Imposed Sentence, § 973.04; Double Jeopardy
State v. Charles Lamar, 2011 WI 50, affirming 2009 WI App 133; for Lamar: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
Sentence Credit, Previously Imposed Sentence, § 973.04
Two concurrent sentences were initially imposed following guilty pleas to aggravated battery and misdemeanor bail jumping, both as repeater. The Agg Batt plea was withdrawn on postconviction motion, but the bail jumping wasn’t challenged.
Habeas – Challenge to Release Date – Sentence Credit
State ex rel. Christopher L. Shelton v. Smith, 2010AP719, District 2, 1/26/11
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity; State Resp.
Shelton was sentenced on two pre-TIS counts: an active (indeterminate) prison sentence on one count and a consecutive term of probation on the other. He served out the first sentence, with the prison indisputably holding him 143 days past his release date.